















DESA Working Paper No. 63
ST/ESA/2008/DWP/63
January 2008
A Framework for Analyzing Tariffs and Subsidies in
Water Provision to Urban Households in Developing 
Countries
David le Blanc
David le Blanc is currently Senior Sustainable Development Oﬃ   cer in the Division for Sustainable 
Development. Before joining the United Nations, he worked as an economist for the World Bank 
and other organizations. E-mail: leblanc@un.org.
Comments should be addressed by e-mail to the author.
Abstract
Th   is paper aims to present a basic conceptual framework for understanding the main practical issues 
and challenges relating to tariﬀ  s and subsidies in the water sector in developing countries. Th  e  paper 
introduces the basic economic notions relevant to the water sector; presents an analytical framework 
for assessing the need for and evaluating subsidies; and discusses the recent evidence on the features 
and performance of water tariﬀ  s and subsidies in various regions, with a special focus on Africa. Th  e 
discussion is limited to the provision of drinking water to urban households in developing countries. 
JEL classiﬁ  cation: D42, D61, H71, L95
Keywords: water, access to water, tariﬀ  s, subsidies, urban developmentUN/DESA Working Papers are preliminary 
documents circulated in a limited number of 
copies and posted on the DESA website at 
http://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers to stimulate 
discussion and critical comment. Th  e  views 
and opinions expressed herein are those of the 
author and do not necessarily reﬂ  ect those of 
the United Nations Secretariat. Th  e  designations 
and terminology employed may not conform to 
United Nations practice and do not imply the 
expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part 
of the Organization.
Editor: Lauren E. Anderson
Typesetter: Leah McDavid
United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Aﬀ  airs
2 United Nations Plaza, Room DC2-1428
New York, N.Y. 10017, USA
Tel: (1-212) 963-4761  •  Fax: (1-212) 963-4444
e-mail: esa@un.org
http://www.un.org/esa/desa/papersContents
1 Introduction  ................................................................................................................................. 1
2 Provision of Drinking Water: Basic Notions .................................................................................  2
  2-1 Institutional Setting ..................................................................................................... 2
 2-2  Diﬀ  erent Forms of Access and Provision ......................................................................  4
 2-3  Costs  ............................................................................................................................ 4
 2-4  Tariﬀ  s  ...........................................................................................................................  6
 2-5  Discussion  ................................................................................................................... 8
3 Subsidies   ...................................................................................................................................... 9
 3-1  Th   e Rationale for Water Subsidies ................................................................................  9
  3-2 Potential Eﬀ  ects of Water Subsidies ..............................................................................  11
 3-3  Deﬁ  ning Eﬃ   ciency, Equity, and Coverage....................................................................  12
  3-4 Who Should Get Which Subsidies?  ..............................................................................  15
  3-5 Who Should Pay for Subsidies? ....................................................................................  17
  3-6 Implementing Common Forms of Water Subsidies ......................................................  18
  3-7 Other Criteria for Evaluating Subsidies ........................................................................  19
  3-8 Subsidy Measurement Issues ........................................................................................  21
4 How Do Subsidies Fare in Practice? .............................................................................................. 24
  4-1 How do the Poor Fare in Terms of Access? ...................................................................  24
 4-2  Th   e Price of Water .......................................................................................................  25
  4-3 Household Expenditures on Water  ...............................................................................  28
 4-4  Th   e Performance of Utilities  .........................................................................................  30
  4-5 Households’ Need for Subsidies and Willingness to Pay for Improved
      Water Services ............................................................................................................. 33
 4-6  Th   e Performance of Water Subsidies ............................................................................  34
  4-7 Towards A Broader View of Government Interventions Aimed at Increasing Access
      to Improved Water Services .........................................................................................  36
5 Conclusion: Incorporating the Framework Into Water Sector Reforms in Africa ..........................  37
  5-1 Water Reforms in Africa: Some Political Economy Issues .............................................  38
 5-2  Recommendations  .......................................................................................................  39




Access to improved drinking water has long been recognized as one of the main challenges of development. 
One of the targets of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) is to reduce by half the proportion of 
people without sustainable access to safe drinking water by 2015. For Africa, achieving this objective is likely 
to represent an even greater challenge than in other regions of the world. A crucial challenge in improv-
ing the coverage of water services in poor countries is the ﬁ  nancing of investment in water production and 
distribution capacity. Th   is issue has received considerable attention among the development community (see 
e.g. World Water Council, 2006). Th   e issue of water tariﬀ  s and subsidies has perhaps received less attention, 
although it is also crucial to the matter. Th   is paper focuses on water tariﬀ  s and subsidies, both from a norma-
tive and a positive side.
Th   is paper aims to present a basic conceptual framework for understanding the main practical is-
sues and challenges relating to tariﬀ  s and subsidies in the water sector in developing countries. It introduces 
the basic economic notions relevant to the water sector ; presents an analytical framework for assessing the 
need for and evaluating subsidies ; and discusses the recent evidence on the features and performance of 
water tariﬀ  s and subsidies in various regions, with a special focus on Africa. Th   e discussion is limited to the 
provision of drinking water to urban households in developing countries.2 Among the issues examined are: 
(i) What are the main questions that arise when governments want to subsidize access to and consumption 
of water? (ii) What are the key features of water tariﬀ  s and subsidies that have been implemented around the 
world? (iii) How can we assess the performance of various subsidy programs? (iv) How well have subsidies 
performed in practice? 
Rather than in producing new messages, the value added of the paper lies in its bringing together 
concepts and evidence from distinct ﬁ  elds of literature. On the one hand, theoretical publications on utility 
tariﬀ  s and subsidies have focused heavily on optimal incentive schemes for utility management as well as 
broader regulatory issues (see Joskow, 2005, for a synthesis). On the other hand, empirical publications, 
mostly from development institutions, tend to focus on speciﬁ  c projects or countries and do not necessarily 
make explicit links or references to the theory. In the middle, the public ﬁ  nance-oriented literature, which 
has been used to provide analytical frameworks for the evaluation of subsidies in various sectors such as 
1 Th  e  ﬁ  rst draft of this paper was written as a background for an intervention of the author at the Capacity Building 
Workshop on Partnerships for Improving the Performance of Water Utilities in the Africa Region, organized by UN-
DESA in Nairobi during December 6-8, 2006. I thank Jean-Michel Chéné, Daniel Platz and David O’Connor for 
useful comments and suggestions. Th   e views reﬂ  ected here are the author’s and do not necessarily reﬂ  ect the oﬃ   cial 
position of the United Nations Secretariat.
2  Broader problems of water allocation across sectors, in which tariﬀ  s play an important role, are not elaborated upon. 
However, it should be kept in mind that allocation of water between sectors has been and remains a pervasive policy 
issue, in developing and developed countries alike. Ineﬃ   cient allocations sustained by distorted prices or subsidies 
to, e.g. agricultural water use, may generate waste of water and/or unsustainable water consumption. Th   e problem is 
exacerbated in countries or regions where water is scarce. In those circumstances, re-allocation of the available water 
supply between customers may already go a long way to alleviating water scarcity problems; and getting incentives right 
for an eﬃ   cient use of water by diﬀ  erent users may prove to be the most urgent question to tackle.2  DESA Working Paper No. 63
education and housing, has rarely been used in the context of water provision. Th   is paper, by bringing 
together those three strands of literature, aims at oﬀ  ering practitioners a compact and uniﬁ  ed framework to 
think about tariﬀ  s and subsidies in the water sector.
Among various sources, the paper relies on two recent studies. Th  e  ﬁ  rst one, published in 2005 by 
Paul Joskow, reviews the theoretical underpinnings of water cost structure and tariﬀ  s (Joskow, 2005) and 
their implications for regulation. Th   e second one, published in 2005 by the World Bank, carefully reviews 
most of the existing studies of water tariﬀ  s and subsidies in developing countries, with a view to assess their 
performance in targeting the poor (Komives and others, 2005). Th   e reader is referred to these two compre-
hensive papers for a more complete treatment of some the issues examined. 
Th   e paper is constructed as follows. Section 2 introduces the framework of drinking water provision 
in developing countries. It introduces the various ways by which water is supplied, the variety of water pro-
viders, as well as the institutional setting in which water distribution takes place. It then brieﬂ  y recapitulates 
the economics behind costs and tariﬀ  s in the water sector, with an emphasis on utilities. In section 3, water 
subsidies are introduced. Th   is section also presents public economics criteria by which subsidy programs may 
be evaluated. Section 4 examines the performance of tariﬀ  s and subsidies, as analyzed from real cases. Th  e 
ﬁ  nal section of the paper brieﬂ  y attempts to draw some lessons from the review of evidence undertaken in 
the previous sections.
2 Provision of Drinking Water: Basic Notions
Th   is section presents the basic environment in which potable water provision occurs, with an emphasis on 
contexts found in developing countries. It also examines in more details the economics behind costs and 
tariﬀ   structures in water provision and highlights the main factors inﬂ  uencing the observed discrepancy 
between costs and tariﬀ  s.
2-1 Institutional Setting
Water provision in the urban context takes place in a legal and regulatory environment which typically com-
bines several levels of intervention. 
At the international level, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) include several targets di-
rectly or indirectly related to water management. Th   e target 10, which reads, “Halve by 2015, the proportion 
of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and improved sanitation” has the most direct impact 
on national policies relating to access to drinking water.
At the national level, the following entities usually have a say in deﬁ  ning the environment in which 
provision of drinking water takes place:
Th   e State, through line ministries in charge of water and sanitation, and sometimes through  • 
ministries in charge of social programs (mostly for the subsidy aspect),
Th   e regulating agency, which may be part of the sector ministry or independent, • 
Intermediate levels of government, which may intervene for example in the implementation of  • 
water subsidies, 
Municipalities, which are typically responsible for basic service provision in their jurisdictions,  • 
and may own local utility companies.A Framework for Analyzing Tariffs ... in Developing Countries         3
Other stakeholders may be involved in policy-making to varying degrees depending on the country 
considered; they include in particular: 
Water utility companies (public or private); • 
Alternative providers (communities, private sector entities); • 
Households, as well as other types of consumers (agricultural, commercial and industrial), di- • 
rectly or through intermediaries, e.g. community representatives.
It is not within the scope of this paper to explore the relations between these diﬀ  erent stakehold-
ers, nor to examine how their interaction results in particular sets of policies, tariﬀ  s, and subsidies for water 
supply. However, the mere mention of this variety of stakeholders should make clear that political economy 
considerations play a key role in the outcomes observed at the national and local level.3 In the context of this 
paper, which aims at examining the nature and performances of tariﬀ  s and subsidy programs, two speciﬁ  c 
points are worth emphasizing:
First, the degree to which international goals such as the MDGs are integrated into national policies 
and percolate to local level actors such as utilities is highly variable. In some cases, the connection is minimal 
or even non-existent; that is, national goals in terms of access to potable water are not disaggregated into 
ground-level objectives and operational programs that would allow the achievement of these goals.4 
Second, at the national level, the diﬀ  erent actors (e.g. in a simple conﬁ  guration, the State, the 
regulator, the utility companies, and municipalities) have diﬀ  erent and potentially conﬂ  icting objectives.5 In 
a context of private utility companies, these problems are exacerbated by asymmetric information, i.e., the 
utility has more information on its technology and costs than the regulator does. Th   is generates information-
al rents, which the regulator has to minimize by designing adequate mechanisms. An associated problem is 
so-called “regulatory capture”, by which the regulator may collude with utilities at the expense of the taxpayers. 
Th   e problems associated with asymmetry of information between utilities and their regulators have 
received a lot of attention in the economic literature. It is not the subject of this paper to describe them in 
detail, and the reader is instead referred to Joskow (2005) and Laﬀ  ont and Tirole (1993). For the purpose of 
this paper, it suﬃ   ces to note that these problems translate concretely into a question of credibility of regula-
tors. In developing country contexts, where capacities may be limited, the independence of the regulator 
both from the Ministry of Water and from the utility companies (public or private) that operate the services 
has been a recurrent stumbling block in water sector reforms.6 
3 Th   e focus here is on the supply of drinking water to urban households. When broader problems of water allocation, say 
between diﬀ  erent types of consumers, are considered, the number of stakeholders increase dramatically, and so does the 
importance of political economy considerations over economic considerations in the outcomes in terms of tariﬀ  s and 
subsidies.
4 Th   is could stem from a number of factors, including: (i) the fact that the set of people who attend international 
meetings devoted to MDGs does not intersect with the set of local stakeholders implementing water policies on the 
ground, such as utility managers; (ii) the lack of comprehensive water policies, implementation plans, and related 
budgets; (iii) deﬁ  ciencies in the local implementation of national policies reﬂ  ecting the MDGs.
5  For example, the State may be concerned with universal access to piped water; with ways of ensuring that the poor 
beneﬁ  t from minimal standards of service; and with avoiding adverse environmental outcomes from water sector 
activities. Th   e regulator will tend to focus on enforcing minimal standards of quality of service and norms for extension 
of the network. It may impose obligations of universal service upon the providers (see below). Municipalities will be 
concerned by aspects relating to provision in their jurisdiction. Lastly, utility companies will aim at maximizing proﬁ  ts 
under the prevailing regulatory constraints.
6  For an introduction to the challenges of pro-poor regulation in a developing country context, see Trémolet and 
Halphern, 2006.4  DESA Working Paper No. 63
2-2 Diﬀ  erent Forms of Access and Provision
In contrast with developed countries where the provision of drinking water to households is overwhelmingly 
achieved through utilities, access to drinking water in developing countries encompasses many forms. In-
deed, rates of connection to the public network vary a lot across countries, as well as within countries. Other 
forms of provision include:
Direct access to a water source (underground or surface); • 
Access to alternative sources of water, typically provided by the private sector (e.g. water tankers,  • 
water carts, kiosks, bottled water);
Access to piped water through community taps or standpipes. • 
In economic terms, water provision can be categorized as a multi-attribute product. Water services 
can be deﬁ  ned by (at least) three dimensions: price, quantity, and quality. Price refers to the price of a unit of 
drinking water (liter or cubic meter). Quantity refers to the number of such units. In the case of water ser-
vices, quality must be added to the list, reﬂ  ecting the fact that diﬀ  erent forms of water provision are imper-
fect substitutes. Quality is a vector of attributes, which encompasses inter alia the following dimensions:
composition in terms of toxins, pollutants, etc., hazardous to health; • 
degree of privacy and availability of the service (private house tap – yard tap – tanker – kiosk –  • 
well, etc.);
physical characteristics of the service (water ﬂ  ow at the tap; water pressure; etc.);  • 
reliability of the service over time (predictability / advance notice for disconnection; shortage  • 
periods; pressure variations; etc.).
It is important to note that in many countries, households have to rely on more than one source of 
water. Th   is is the case even for families connected to the public network because limitations to the services 
provided by the utility can take many forms depending on the local context, including; rationing of certain 
areas; low water pressures; periodic shortages; or leaks in the network. Th   e implications of this diversity in 
terms of social policies will be elaborated on in this paper. 
2-3 Costs
We will mainly discuss the structure of costs for water utilities. Th   is is a well studied domain, notably 
because knowledge of the cost structure of the water industry has for a long time been critical to regula-
tory institutions in developed countries. Moreover, the utility model is still seen as the standard paradigm 
for water services delivery in urban contexts and, as such, has received a lot of attention from governments, 
economists, ﬁ  nanciers, and development institutions. By contrast, the cost structure of alternative forms of 
provision is far less well known and has only recently come under scrutiny (see Kariuki and Schwartz, 2005). 
Water utilities typically engage in the production, treatment, transport and distribution of drinking 
water to customers located in their service area. Th   ese activities typically have increasing returns to scale, at 
least up to a certain size (see Joskow, 2005). Compared to other utilities like telecommunications and elec-
tricity, water production is very capital-intensive (see Komives and others, 2005, p33).7 Moreover, the capital 
assets used in water supply cannot be moved to another location and are generally unusable for any other 
purpose; they represent an extreme type of ﬁ  xed capital, associated with sunk costs.
7  In the USA, for example, the ratio of capital investment to revenues in the water industry is double that in natural gas, 
and 70% higher than in electricity or telecommunications (Hanemann, 2006).A Framework for Analyzing Tariffs ... in Developing Countries         5
As a consequence of these two features, water production is typically thought of as a natural mo-
nopoly. Th   at is, it is typically the case that long-run marginal costs are below long-run average costs. A well 
known but very important consequence of this feature of the production technology is that, supposing it 
were possible to precisely deﬁ  ne a “marginal cost ” that customers had to pay (see the discussion below), one-
part tariﬀ  s based on marginal costs would not allow the utility to break even, since marginal costs are lower 
than average costs. Hence, water utilities tend to produce structural deﬁ  cits. Th   is feature is at odds with the 
objective of cost recovery, needed for the long-term ﬁ  nancial sustainability of the utility. 
Th   eoretical solutions to this problem have long been known. Generally speaking, the solutions 
consist of engaging in some form of price discrimination, i.e. having diﬀ  erent consumers pay diﬀ  erent prices 
for the marginal unit of water (so-called “third-degree price discrimination”); having diﬀ  erent units sold 
at diﬀ  erent prices for any given consumer (“second-degree price discrimination”, or non-linear tariﬀ  ); or a 
combination of both. 
Boiteux (1971) showed that the optimal uniform one-part tariﬀ   for a utility subject to a break-even 
constraint involves Ramsey pricing, i.e. consumers pay a markup over marginal cost that is inversely propor-
tional to their price elasticity of demand.8 A practical consequence of this ﬁ  nding is that industries, which 
have been found empirically to have higher price elasticities than individual consumers (see Komives and 
others, 2005, p18), should be charged less per unit than the latter. In practice, it is very often the contrary 
which occurs. It was later shown (Brown and Sibley, 1986) that two-part tariﬀ  s consisting of a ﬁ  xed charge 
plus a variable charge reﬂ  ecting water consumption, where water is priced at marginal cost, could do even 
better than Boiteux pricing in terms of eﬃ   ciency. Among this class of tariﬀ  s, the most familiar structure is 
the one whereby customers share the ﬁ  xed costs equally, and pay the marginal price of the units they con-
sume (see section 2-4 below). 
In practice, it is diﬃ   cult to apply those concepts as precisely as one would like. Th   e main problem is 
to deﬁ  ne a marginal cost which should be applied to a particular consumer.
 First, for the utility, short-run and long-run marginal costs of production diﬀ  er widely. Th  e  short-
run marginal cost of producing an additional cubic meter of water for a utility is typically very low, un-
less production capacity limits are reached (in which case there is the need for additional investment). Th  e 
determinant of capacity needs will be the aggregation of individual consumer demands. Th   is is analogous 
to electricity, where it is peak-load demand that really determines capacity needs. Relevant marginal costs of 
production should be the long-run costs. 
Second, strictly speaking, short-run marginal costs vary across time. For example, water is scarcer 
during the dry season. To the extent that water has to be allocated between competing uses, tariﬀ  s should 
reﬂ  ect the associated varying opportunity cost. In practice though, it has not been judged practical to price 
water so as to reﬂ  ect all the sources of change in the costs of production.9
Th   ird, the marginal cost of distributing an additional cubic meter of water for the utility varies, 
depending on which consumer gets it. Th   is is because the cost of distribution varies with location, sometimes 
importantly. For example, marginal, mountainous areas located at the fringe of the city will be more expen-
sive to service than centrally located, ﬂ  at areas. Moreover, a large portion of the costs incurred by the utility 
8 See  Laﬀ  ont and Tirole (2000) for a complete exposition of this result and generalizations. 
9  Water scarcity is reﬂ  ected by higher tariﬀ  s in summer in some developed countries. For example, Maryland (USA) has 
a winter tariﬀ   and a summer tariﬀ  .6  DESA Working Paper No. 63
is not easily attributable to particular consumers. Th   is is the case of the costs of operation and maintenance 
for the water mains and the secondary network. Deciding who should pay for what portion of the expenses 
involves a large degree of arbitrariness. In practice, tariﬀ   structures tend to be uniform over large areas, and 
consumers with high access costs are subsidized by low-access cost customers. Th   is lack of spatial diﬀ  erentia-
tion of tariﬀ  s can stem either from political unwillingness to diﬀ  erentiate tariﬀ  s, or from explicit non-dis-
crimination obligations imposed by the regulator.
2-4 Tariﬀ  s
Utilities
As explained in Joskow (2005), if tariﬀ  s were to reﬂ  ect costs, due to the structure of costs of utilities, the 
prevalent type of tariﬀ  s structure could take the form of a two-part tariﬀ  , composed of:
a variable charge reﬂ  ecting the marginal costs of providing an additional cubic meter of water  • 
for the utility;
a ﬁ  xed charge intended to cover the unattributable portion of the costs that is independent of  • 
the quantity consumed (ﬁ  xed costs of production and distribution), as well as ensuring that the 
utility can break even.
Th   e simplest two-part tariﬀ   structure which ensures that the utility breaks even consists of dividing 
the ﬁ  xed costs equally among the consumers, and charging the marginal cost on all units consumed. If all 
consumers were identical, it would make sense to provide the service as soon as the net surplus of consumers 
is positive. However, in practice consumers diﬀ  er in income and tastes. In particular, the ﬁ  xed charge implied 
by an even sharing of ﬁ  xed costs may be large compared to the income of the poorest households. Some 
households facing this tariﬀ   structure will ﬁ  nd it rational not to connect to the network10, even though faced 
with a linear tariﬀ   they would consume a small quantity of water. Some households are then excluded from 
piped water consumption.
Provided the ﬁ  rm or the regulator has some information on the distribution of income and valua-
tion of water services in the population, it is possible to improve on this outcome by combining second- and 
third-degree price discrimination. One solution is to propose a menu of non-linear tariﬀ  s which will better 
accommodate the heterogeneity of income and tastes in the population, and let households self-select into 
the tariﬀ   structures they prefer. For example, the utility can propose two tariﬀ  s: one “high-volume” service, 
with a high ﬁ  xed charge and a low marginal rate, and a “low-volume” service, with a lower ﬁ  xed charge but 
higher marginal rate. Households expecting to consume high quantities of water should select the former 
option, while those expecting to consume little water should select the latter (this example is drawn from 
Joskow, 2005). Th  is  tariﬀ   diﬀ  erentiation should mitigate the problem of a high ﬁ  xed charge that could pre-
vent poor households from connecting to the network. Such menus of tariﬀ  s have been used for decades in 
France for electricity. Such a menu is illustrated in ﬁ  gure 1. In this example, the ﬁ  rst tariﬀ   has a ﬁ  xed charge 
of US $4 and a volumetric rate of US $0.25 per cubic meter. Th   e second tariﬀ   has a ﬁ  xed charge of US $2 
and a volumetric rate of US$ 0.4. For consumption above 13 cubic meters, the ﬁ  rst tariﬀ   is more economical.
In practice however, water tariﬀ  s are often very diﬀ  erent from this theoretical structure. Table 1 
below presents the most common forms of tariﬀ  s practiced by utilities. Prices paid for diﬀ  erent quanti-
10  In this paragraph we consider only recurrent expenditures on water and abstract from one-shot connection fees 
incurred at the time of connection. As later explained, when they are large relative to the income of households, 
connection fees can in fact exacerbate the problem and result in high proportions of households choosing not to 
connect to the available public network.A Framework for Analyzing Tariffs ... in Developing Countries         7
ties of water under selected tariﬀ  s are 
shown on ﬁ  gure 2. Among the diﬀ  er-
ent types of price structures presented 
here, Increasing Block Tariﬀ  s (IBTs) 
are by far the most common. In Latin 
America, IBTs frequently also include 
ﬁ  xed charges, which makes the tradi-
tional distinction between IBTs and 
two-part tariﬀ  s irrelevant (see Komives 
and others, 2005). Importantly, in the 
absence of metering, only ﬁ  xed charge 
tariﬀ  s can be implemented, which has 
important consequences in terms of 
subsidies (see below). 
An increasingly common 
form of provision consists of provid-
ing a menu of services, diﬀ  erentiated 
by quality, e.g. private connection and 
community taps. Another example 
is a menu of connections with diﬀ  er-
ent technical characteristics (pressure, 
debit, etc.). In those cases, a menu 
of tariﬀ  s will reﬂ  ect this diﬀ  erentia-
tion. Yet another example is a menu 
of tariﬀ  s as the one described above in 
the diﬀ  erentiated two-part tariﬀ  . Th  ose 
tariﬀ  s will be designed so as to induce 
households to self-select in the category 
that ﬁ  ts their needs best. 
It is typically the case that sub-
sidies are associated with such diﬀ  eren-
tiated services. For example, consump-
tion at public taps can be provided for 
free.11 Th   e objectives of such diﬀ  erenti-
ated services and subsidies are : (i) to target subsidies to the poorer households or neighborhoods, by allow-
ing households to self-select the form of service they prefer to use (the implicit assumption being that poor 
households are more likely to use the lower-quality service) ; and (ii) to achieve a greater coverage with the 
same amount of investment, lower quality services such as community taps being less costly to provide and 
covering the needs of more households than private connections.
Other providers
In the case of other providers, tariﬀ  s practiced depend on the nature of the provider. Community-based 
services or water services provided by NGOs can be expected to cover operation and maintenance costs. 



























Menu of Two-Part Tariff  s
Source: author’s elaboration
Figure 2.
Shape of Common Types of Tariff  s Used by Utilities as a Function of 
Consumption
Source: author’s elaboration
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Th   e precise way by which these costs are passed on to speciﬁ  c consumers, however, will depend on the local 
model. It can be assumed that private providers charge households prices that reﬂ  ect their costs. 
2-5 Discussion
In conclusion, there is often a disconnection between the costs incurred by utilities, and the tariﬀ  s which are 
used. We already mentioned theoretical reasons why that is the case. However, technical and political factors 
come into play as well. 
One reason for the disconnect between costs and prices comes from the structure of the water indus-
try. Th   e tendency of water utilities to exhibit structural deﬁ  cits, associated with the need for cost recovery, 
has often implied transfers from outside the utility. Th   ese transfers can be implemented in many forms (see 
section 3 below). Concretely, in many countries capital expenditures are subsidized or paid for by municipal-
ities or other levels of government. Cost recovery tends to be based on recurrent costs, not on capital costs; 
tariﬀ  s typically do not take into account the opportunity cost of capital. Th   e important point is that, almost 
by construction, revenues collected from the consumers are not expected to cover total expenditures from the 
utility as they should from a ﬁ  nancial sustainability point of view. 
Another reason why prices do not reﬂ  ect costs is technical. Implementing variable tariﬀ  s based 
on volume consumed by individual households supposes metering. In many countries, the proportion of 
connections which are metered is low. In many developed countries, the trend has been towards the gen-
eralization of metering, motivated by better incentive structures. Under a ﬁ  xed charge tariﬀ  , the water bill 
being independent of the quantity consumed, there is no incentive to save on water use.12 However, in many 
developing countries, metering is not yet common. Moreover, in some cases, systematic metering may not be 
the best approach because the associated costs may be greater than the associated beneﬁ  ts.
Lastly, water tariﬀ  s, on top of economic considerations, frequently reﬂ  ect policy objectives.13 Th  e 
“natural monopoly” characteristics of water utilities, together with the politically sensitive nature of water 
12 Th  e  eﬀ  ect of a change to a volumetric tariﬀ   can be sizeable. Available data show that the decrease in water consumption 
following the introduction of meters can be high (quoted ﬁ  gures are ten per cent in England, 20 per cent in Senegal).
13  A recent review of practices in developing countries concluded that tariﬀ  s are increasingly used to satisfy other 
objectives than cost recovery (OECD, 2003).
Table 1.
Water Tariff   Structures Most Commonly Used by Utilities
Fixed Charge: the bill does not depend on the quantity of water consumed
Volumetric Charge: the bill depends on the quantity of water consumed
Uniform rate: all units (cubic meters) are priced at the same rate, independently of total consumption
Non-Uniform rate: units are priced diff  erently 
Block tariff  : all units falling into certain bounds (“blocks”) are priced the same
Increasing Block Tariff   (IBT): the marginal rate increases with the block       
Decreasing Block Tariff  : the marginal rate decreases with the block       
Volume-diff  erentiated tariff  s (VDT): all units are priced at the same rate, but the rate depends on total consumption
Two-Part Tariff  : composed of a fi  xed charge plus a variable charge which depends on the quantity of water consumed
Uniform two-part tariff  : the fi  xed charge and the volumetric rate are the same for all connections
Diff  erentiated two-part tariff  : there is a menu of services with diff  erent sets of fi  xed charges and rates
Fixed Charge plus Volumetric Rate: combine fi  xed charges with the tariff  s above (e.g. IBT) 
Source: author’s elaborationA Framework for Analyzing Tariffs ... in Developing Countries         9
provision, have often provided a rationale for government involvement in water provision. In some coun-
tries, government intervention tended to take the form of public ownership of utilities, with no separate 
regulation function. In many countries, this is still the dominant paradigm. Elsewhere, however, government 
intervention has evolved towards regulation, with production and distribution increasingly left to indepen-
dent operators (public or private). Historically, regulation has given substantial consideration to the way mo-
nopoly rents are shared between utilities and the consumers, with an emphasis on consumers’ interests. Th  is 
implies a drive for “fair” tariﬀ  s, associated to policies such as universal service obligations aimed at ensuring 
access to “basic” services to the majority of or all the population.
Moreover, in large parts of the world, and especially in poor countries, the concept of water as a 
social good prevails over that of water as an economic good. As a result, it is often commonly admitted that 
full cost recovery is not an adequate objective in the case of water services. Th   e transition from one concept 
to another may be driven by changing perceptions, higher incomes, or water shortages.
Whatever the precise form of institutional arrangement prevailing in a given country, public involve-
ment in water matters means that water tariﬀ  s are not the direct product of market forces. Rather, tariﬀ  s 
(and subsidies) are determined by a number of factors, only some of which are related to costs. Th  is  explains 
the wide variety of tariﬀ  s schedules encountered across cities, regions, and countries.
3 Subsidies
Th   is section reviews the various aspects of water subsidies. It begins with a short overview of the rationale 
for such subsidies (3-1) and their potential eﬀ  ects on the economy (3.2). Th   e next sections examine who the 
recipients of water subsidies should be (3.3), and how subsidies should be ﬁ  nanced (3.4). Th   e most common 
forms of water subsidies are presented in section 3-5. Section 3.6 presents criteria commonly used to evaluate 
water subsidies. Subsidy measurement issues are considered in section 3.7.
3-1 Th   e Rationale for Water Subsidies 
Access to safe drinking water has been recognized internationally as a basic human need. Access to safe water 
has tremendous direct and indirect impacts on poverty-related outcomes, the main of which are:14 
An improvement in health outcomes, and in particular infant mortality rates, and a correspond- • 
ing reduction in health expenses;
A reduction in the time spent on fetching water (a task mostly undertaken by women and chil- • 
dren); the time thus freed can be used for education (children) and income-generating activities 
(women);
At the aggregate level, a reduction in the incidence of epidemics whose propagation is facilitated  • 
by lack of water for drinking and basic health practices15;
In the urban context, from the household’s point of view, access to the public network often  • 
translates into a reduction of the costs of accessing basic water requirements, which in the ab-
sence of such supply must be acquired from more costly alternative sources.
14  For an extensive discussion of the positive eﬀ  ects of access to safe water, see e.g. UNDP (2006).
15 Th   is externality is in fact stronger in the case of sanitation than for water provision. Provision of water without 
associated basic sewage and sanitation can in fact exacerbate health problems locally, as untreated wastewater serves as a 
vector of transmissible diseases (see Lauria, Hopkins and Debomy, 2005, for a discussion of this in Dakar, Senegal). 10  DESA Working Paper No. 63
Th   e relative importance of these beneﬁ  ts varies across locations, depending inter alia on the nature 
of alternative water resources available to households. However, there is no doubt that in most cases, projects 
oﬀ  ering access to drinking water supply have very high social returns.16 Moreover, from an examination of 
the various beneﬁ  ts provided by a connection to the water network, it appears that a lot of them are purely 
private. 
Th   is combination of public and private beneﬁ  ts from clean drinking water suggests it is a “merit 
good” which would be underconsumed if left entirely to the market. Th   is is especially true in developing 
countries where a large portion of households does not have access to basic utilities or shelter. Th   is may be 
considered the main reason for including access to safe drinking water in the Millennium Development Goals 
(Target 10, see above), and it explains why water has typically received a lot of attention from policy makers. 
Another reason for government intervention is economies of scale. Economies of scale in water pro-
vision justify bulk provision of water, as opposed to individual provision, such that it is collectively rational 
to invest heavily, something individual households cannot do. Th   is is compounded by the fact that water 
utilities are a highly capital-intensive activity, requiring investments at a scale only governments or private 
companies can achieve.
Other rationales for government intervention relate to market incompleteness, or to the mere pov-
erty of households, all conditions that may prevail in the context of many developing countries. 
Market incompleteness: Th   is may apply to the time spent on fetching water. If no income gener-
ating activity is available as an alternative to fetching water, time and money are not substitutes and the 
household is better oﬀ   fetching water than connecting to the network and incurring cash expenditures for 
which there is no corresponding additional income. Th   is may also be the case for children sent to fetch water 
instead of attending school. In that case, households cannot borrow against the future income generated by a 
better education of their children to pay for the expenses of safe water. Again, the household is better oﬀ   opt-
ing for the status quo. In such cases, the beneﬁ  ts provided by access to safe drinking water cannot be mon-
etized. In the absence of additional cash to pay for safe water provision, households are caught in a liquidity 
trap that prevents choosing better water systems.
Poverty: Households can be so poor that they are at a corner solution for a particular category of 
goods or expenses (i.e. the utility-maximizing consumption bundle does not contain some of the goods). 
Th   is is typically the case of luxury goods. For example, households may be too poor to face the health expen-
ditures occasioned by a deﬁ  cient source of water. Th   e fact that they are better oﬀ   when safe water is provided 
constitutes a net welfare gain, but it does not follow that the households, even if they recognize it, would be 
willing to incur the corresponding expenditure, because they have no money to allocate to it.
Lastly, cultural factors are also important. In many contexts, low observed demand for improved 
water services is likely to come at least in part from lack of awareness of the beneﬁ  ts associated with drinking 
safe water, especially regarding health outcomes. 
Th   ese considerations strongly make the case for government intervention to facilitate access to safe 
water. If the poor do not have access to ﬁ  nancial markets and relevant information, or are discriminated 
against, subsidies targeting the most disadvantaged sections of the population are justiﬁ  ed. But other forms 
16  See Poverty-environment Partnership, 2005.A Framework for Analyzing Tariffs ... in Developing Countries         11
of intervention could also be contemplated to alleviate liquidity constraints, such as providing for the spread-
ing over time of connection fees, e.g. by dividing the amount into small payments which are added to the 
periodic bill. Th   is approach, which does not necessarily involve subsidies,17 has been used in some countries. 
Awareness campaigns on the beneﬁ  t of safe water for drinking and basic hygiene are other types of interven-
tion that may usefully complement subsidies.
Other considerations may apply. For a government with a concern for vertical equity, water subsi-
dies may serve as a redistribution device. When the government can observe incomes, an income tax should 
suﬃ   ce to achieve redistribution (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1976).18 However, this conclusion is of little practical 
relevance in developing countries where income and wealth are not easily observable for a large part of the 
population, due to the importance of informal markets and the absence of monitoring systems. In that case, 
subsidizing water directly could lead to better targeted transfers. Th   e empirical relevance of redistribution as 
a justiﬁ  cation for water subsidies is examined further in section 4 below.
Th   rough the lessons learned by speciﬁ  c countries, there has also been a growing consensus that the 
institutional and regulatory environment in which water provision develops is of primary importance to 
understand its shortfalls or successes in reaching the poor. Reﬂ  ecting this new consensus, in complement to 
intervening directly through investment and/or subsidy programs, enabling the reform of institutions and 
providing related capacity building to government staﬀ   has been a growing activity of international donors 
during the past decade (see Trémolet, 2006, for a study of four African countries).
3-2 Potential Effects of Water Subsidies 
Th  e  eﬀ  ects of government taxes and expenditures (or other policies) on the economy are generally considered 
from the angles of allocation and redistribution (see e.g. Musgrave, 1959).
Allocation
As a result of any policy, the allocation of resources is changed, i.e. the mix of goods and services produced 
by the economy is altered. In the case of water subsidies, another dimension which has practical importance 
is the impact of subsidies on the quality of water services provided to households. 
Compared with other household subsidies (e.g. housing subsidies) which potentially aﬀ  ect many 
allocations in the economy, the primary impact of subsidies to drinking water is to aﬀ  ect the consumption 
choices of households. It can be expected that water subsidies to households will have smaller eﬀ  ects on the 
rest of the price system and the economy than housing subsidies, because the importance of water in the 
households’ expenditures is limited. It typically represents between one and ﬁ  ve per cent of average house-
hold expenditures (see Komives and others, 2005, p 41-42). Th   us, on the household side, water subsidies 
can be expected to have signiﬁ  cant eﬀ  ects mainly on the margin between the consumption of water and the 
consumption of other goods. Generally speaking, water subsidies lower the price of water relative to the price 
of other consumption goods. If water is a normal good, both the substitution eﬀ  ect and the income eﬀ  ect 
are positive, and water is consumed in greater quantity. Th   is should aﬀ  ect positively both the uptake (the 
number of households deciding to connect to the network, given access to it), and the consumption of water 
for connected households.
17  An interest rate can be charged so that the advance of the connection fee amount is equivalent to a loan.
18 Th   is conclusion does not hold if there are positive externalities associated with safe water. In that case water subsidies 
could perform better than income subsidies, because they directly aﬀ  ect the water prices perceived by households.12  DESA Working Paper No. 63
Another margin that can be aﬀ  ected is labor supply (or school enrollment). As piped water replaces 
water fetched from distant sources, household members are able to supply more work time (intensive mar-
gin), or even to enter the labor force (extensive margin). Th  e  eﬀ  ects of access to water programs or projects 
on, say, women’s labor supply have unfortunately received little attention, as far as we are aware.
On the production / supply side, the margins most likely to be aﬀ  ected are:
Th   e overall investment in water and sanitation achieved in the economy. Depending on the way  i. 
subsidies are delivered and ﬁ  nanced by the government, they can alter the returns on investment 
in the sector and potentially deter investment in that sector.
Th   e type of water providers operating in the market. Subsidies to public water companies, in the  ii. 
form of tax rebates, ﬁ  nancial support of current expenditures, or subsidized ﬁ  nancing, distort 
competition in the sector. It can aﬀ  ect the willingness of non-utility providers (e.g. private alter-
native providers) to enter the market. 
Th   e total quantity of water produced and consumed. In practice, it is diﬃ   cult to say in which  iii. 
direction the quantity of water produced changes, compared with a situation without subsidies. 
First, in a typical developing country, utilities may be under-ﬁ  nanced and in a situation of ra-
tioning (either through limiting the number of connections or through rationing the supply to 
certain days / hours in the day / geographical zones, etc.). Higher demand in this case does not 
translate into higher supply. Second, the crowding out eﬀ  ects mentioned in point ii above will 
aﬀ  ect the overall size of the market, and hence the quantity of water produced and distributed. 
Th   e quality of water services provided to households. As mentioned above, subsidy programs  iv. 
can be expected to have an impact on service quality. Indeed, some performance-based subsidies 
are explicitly aiming at improving some aspects of service quality. Th   ose could also be the indi-
rect consequences of subsidies based on other targets [like a decrease in unaccounted-for water 
(UfW), or better collection rates].
Th   ese factors must be taken into account for developing sound policies in the water sector. In many 
developing countries, coverage by the public piped network is not universal and public budgets do not allow 
enough investment to achieve full coverage, and alternative providers are eﬀ  ectively providing for the basic 
water needs of an important part of the population.
Distribution
Government policies explicitly or implicitly redistribute resources. Th   e fundamental issue is then how 
policies change the distribution of income within the economy. Th   is generic question can be broken down 
into several speciﬁ  c sub-questions. In particular, one is often concerned with vertical redistribution (are the 
transfer ﬂ  ows induced by the subsidy going from the rich to the poor, from decile y to decile z of the income 
distribution, etc.) and horizontal redistribution (comparing the situation of diﬀ  erent household sub-groups in 
a particular income range before and after the redistribution caused by the subsidy). 
3-3 Deﬁ  ning Efﬁ  ciency, Equity, and Coverage 
Th   e questions of allocation and distribution can be given a more practical sense. Th   e economic analysis of 
social programs usually relies on three criteria: eﬃ   ciency, equity or targeting, and coverage.A Framework for Analyzing Tariffs ... in Developing Countries         13
Eﬃ   ciency: 
Th   e notion of eﬃ   ciency relates to the allocation of resources in the economy. Th   us, the general question to 
be asked is “Can the same resources be used more eﬃ   ciently, and to what extent?”. However, the very sensi-
tive question of optimal water allocation has often been relegated to general macro-economic discussions. 
Within the water sector, eﬃ   ciency is often examined in a “restricted” sense and relates to the technical and 
commercial eﬃ   ciency of utility companies.
Technical eﬃ   ciency relates to the cost of providing a cubic meter of treated water. As discussed in 
section 3, there are multiple determinants to this cost, and the government or regulator often has to rely on 
indirect information in order to assess the eﬃ   ciency of production of a particular utility company. Bench-
marking, i.e. examining the performance of utilities sharing “similar” characteristics, has been a popular 
technique to overcome, at least in part, problems of asymmetric information. Benchmarking can also be 
associated with incentive mechanisms, by linking subsidies or government funding to the performance of the 
utilities, as measured by comparisons between them. Th   is system has been popular in other sectors such as 
hospitals and is often referred to as “yardstick competition” (Schleifer, 1985). 
Commercial eﬃ   ciency relates to the eﬃ   ciency of the stages going from the distribution of the water 
produced to the collection of payments from customers. Ultimately, the ability of the utility to limit the 
physical and ﬁ  nancial losses from distribution and commercialization will determine the degree of sustain-
ability of the company. It is customary to distinguish:
Th   e proportion of water which is billed (the complement of which is the unaccounted-for water,  • 
UfW). Losses can be due to physical problems (leaks); to illegal connections; and to lack of bill-
ing for certain connections; 
Th   e proportion of billed consumption which is collected. • 
As will be explored below in section 5, commercial eﬃ   ciency has been an almost universal problem 
for developing country utilities. Th   e proportion of water which eventually gets paid for is often very small, 
which jeopardizes the ﬁ  nancial health of utility companies. In the case where water services are provided 
by the private sector, it is often the case that contracts between the delegating authority and the provider 
explicitly include targets (and associated penalties) in terms of indicators related to eﬃ   ciency, such as UfW 
or collection rates.19
In the context of subsidies, the relevant question is whether a particular subsidy program gives 
incentives to utility companies or other providers to improve technical and commercial eﬃ   ciency. As far as 
policy evaluation is concerned, major outcomes will be water production or consumption changes occur-
ring as a result of the policy. A notion related to eﬃ   ciency appropriate in such a case is the leverage eﬀ  ect of a 
program, i.e., how much supplemental investment (in water treatment capacity for a utility, or in equipment 
for safe water provision for a household) will be generated by one dollar of subsidy.20 
Targeting/Vertical Equity: 
Vertical equity relates to the redistribution of income due to the subsidy system and can be explicit or 
implicit. Targeting, on the other hand, refers to the degree to which subsidies go to those who need them 
19  See e.g. Lauria, Hopkins and Debomy (2005),, for the case of Senegal.
20 Th   ere are many ways to estimate this type of impact, i.e., marginal or average impact, short-term vs. long-term 
impact, etc.14  DESA Working Paper No. 63
most.21 It is traditionally measured by the proportion of transfers which reaches the intended beneﬁ  ciaries. 
It is clear that the ability to deﬁ  ne intended beneﬁ  ciaries assumes the existence of a strategy in the ﬁ  rst place, 
which is not always the case.22 Computing (or qualitatively assessing) the distribution of transfers implied by 
a subsidy is necessary for assessing its targeting, coverage and eﬃ   ciency. Th   us, it is worth drawing the atten-
tion of policymakers to this broader issue, instead of focusing only on targeting.
Coverage: 
Coverage refers to the proportion of the target population eﬀ  ectively reached by the subsidy. As the numer-
ous evaluation studies for water subsidies make clear, this may be the most important factor to take into 
account to analyze the performance of water access strategies in developing countries. Low coverage by the 
public networks considerably limits the outreach and redistributive power of subsidies through utility tariﬀ  s 
(see Komives and others, 2005, and section 4 below). It also generates horizontal equity problems, since 
similar households are treated diﬀ  erently depending on whether they are connected or not. By contrast, in 
a developed country context where coverage is almost universal, the quality of targeting of water subsidies 
becomes the most important criterion.
As with other subsidy programs, coverage and targeting are somewhat antagonistic goals in the sense 
that a government may have diﬃ   culties to achieve good targeting and high coverage simultaneously. A con-
venient way to summarize this antagonism is to visualize it in terms of a matrix crossing the type of house-
holds with the outreach of the subsidy (see e.g. Coady, Grosh and Hoddinott, 2004). To simplify, suppose 
that the population can be divided without errors into two categories of households, “Poor” and “non-Poor”. 
Suppose also that the “Poor” category is the oﬃ   cial target of subsidies. For any given subsidy program, a 
two-by-two table (see table 2) can be constructed, giving the partition of the population depending on the 
poverty category and the beneﬁ  t of the subsidy program. 
If the program were perfect, cells oﬀ   the diagonal of 
the table should be empty sets. On the contrary, the pres-
ence of households in the upper right cell of the matrix indi-
cates problems of targeting, or leakages, i.e. households not 
included in the target group beneﬁ  t from the subsidy. Th  e 
presence of households in the lower left cell of the matrix 
indicates problems of coverage, i.e. populations included in the target group are not reached by the subsidy.
In practice, the problem is compounded by measurement issues (see table 3). Owing to the diﬃ   -
culty of measuring poverty and income in general, eligibility for subsidies often has to be determined based 
on proxy variables. Inevitably, the use of proxies will cause two types of errors. First, some poor households 
which belong to the target group will be classiﬁ  ed as non-poor and thus left out of the subsidy scheme. By 
analogy with statistical tests, it is common to refer to these errors as “Type 1 errors” or “errors of exclusion”. 
Second, the opposite will also happen, i.e. non-poor households will be inappropriately classiﬁ  ed as poor on 
the basis of the proxies. Th   is is often called “Type 2 error”. 
Finding good proxies is thus crucial to good targeting, both ex ante (e.g. in designing the subsidy 
scheme) and ex post, in order to check that Type 1 and Type 2 errors are kept under control.
21  From a semantic point of view, “Targeting” refers to a normative policy objective, whereas “distribution” refers to a 
positive analysis tool.
22  For example, strategies for extension of the network may be dictated by considerations of easiness and ﬁ  nancial 
feasibility for the utility company, and not so much by priorities based on income or poverty criteria.
Table  2.
Targeting and Coverage of Subsidy Programs
Poor Non-Poor
Reached Ideal case Leakage issues
Not reached Coverage issues //A Framework for Analyzing Tariffs ... in Developing Countries         15
In the context of water 
consumption subsidies dis-
tributed through low tariﬀ  s by 
utilities to households connect-
ed to the network (e.g. through 
an IBT with subsidized ﬁ  rst 
block), reaching the intended 
beneﬁ  ciaries is complicated 
by a series of hurdles. More precisely, the ﬁ  nal distribution of consumption subsidies to diﬀ  erent groups of 
households will depend on:
Th   e proportion of households having potential access to the network; • 
Th   e proportion of households living in an area with access to the network that choose to con- • 
nect;
Th   e consumption of water of connected households, which determines the amount of subsidies  • 
they receive.23
For policy purposes, it is very important to understand which of those hurdles are really constraining 
the outreach of subsidies to target beneﬁ  ciaries. Th   e World Bank review paper (Komives and others, 2005) 
introduces a neat framework to measure the targeting performance of subsidies based on this decomposition. 
It turns out that such decomposition allows powerful insights on the ways to improve subsidy performance. 
For example, it allows one to answer questions like: “How would the distribution of subsidies be modiﬁ  ed 
if connection rates in the poor neighborhoods were increased to a certain level?”. Some illustrations of this 
analysis are presented in section 4.
3-4 Who Should Get Which Subsidies? 
As mentioned above, the dominant paradigm in the thinking about water subsidies is the utility model. 
Although subsidies can be provided by other channels which will be examined in detail below, it is necessary 
to spend some time on the case of subsidies conveyed through the utility model, because they constitute the 
bulk of existing subsidies, both in developed and developing countries. 
By deﬁ  nition, consuming drinking water through the piped network necessitates a connection to 
the network. Th   us, there are two economic margins to consider: (i) the extensive margin, i.e., the decision 
to connect to the network or not; and (ii) the intensive margin, i.e. the decision on how much water to 
consume given connection. Correspondingly, subsidies to households through the utility can take two dif-
ferent forms (or a combination of them): (i) subsidies to connection; and (ii) subsidies to consumption, e.g. 
through reduced unit prices. Th   e latter kind of subsidies is by far the most common. It is often implemented 
through IBTs or VDTs. 
For public policy purposes, the diﬀ  erence is particularly important. How should the public eﬀ  ort 
and monies be divided between helping utilities to extend the network, and helping connected customers 
to pay their water bills? Ultimately, the answer to this question should come from the examination of local 
situations. In a very schematic way, one can think of decomposing the population in a given area in four 
groups, depending on whether they would have diﬃ   culties to pay the monthly bill corresponding to a sub-
23 Th   e proportion of connections which are metered is also a determinant factor, since it conditions the use of 
diﬀ  erentiated tariﬀ  s, the only alternative in the absence of metering being ﬁ  xed charges.
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sistence consumption level24, and whether they could aﬀ  ord the fees for an individual network connection.25 
Depending on the local distribution of income and the tariﬀ  s practiced by utility companies, the relative 
importance of the four categories will vary. 
Th  is  classiﬁ  cation and the suggested way to come to it oversimplify and thus are potentially mislead-
ing. More adequate strategies for examining the needs for subsidies will be discussed below. However, the 
important point is that public interventions should target the diﬀ  erent categories of households in diﬀ  erent 
ways. Table 4 below illustrates this point.
How to improve the determination of groups needing subsidies and of needed subsidy levels? Th  ere 
are several tools at the disposal of policy makers. First, household consumption and expenditure surveys are 
common in many countries and can be replicated locally. Information on water consumption by households, 
about the price they pay for piped water and water from other sources, can be used to compute the propor-
tion of the total budget that is devoted to water expenditures by diﬀ  erent income groups. From this, esti-
mates of the needs for water subsidies can be constructed.
Second, the willingness to pay (WTP) of households for network water services can be assessed, 
either directly through speciﬁ  c surveys (the so-called “contingent valuation” approach), or indirectly through 
data on consumption of and expenditures on alternative water services (the so-called “revealed preference” 
approach). Although there are methodological diﬃ   culties associated to WTP surveys, and one must be care-
ful in designing the surveys and interpreting the results (see e.g. Komives and others, 2005), reliable esti-
mates of the WTP for network connection or service improvements can be retrieved from local surveys. Th  e 
examination of results from such surveys in various contexts suggests that the willingness of households to 
pay for upgraded water services may be higher than what the reluctance of politicians to make beneﬁ  ciaries 
pay would lead one to believe, suggesting that some degree of cost recovery is not necessarily incompatible 
with provision of services to poor areas or populations. 
Th  e  diﬀ  erence between connection and consumption subsidies is important for another reason. 
Connection subsidies are one-shot subsidies, akin to subsidies to any capital investment. By contrast, sub-
sidizing consumption entails a continuous ﬂ  ow of money towards the utilities or the recipient households, 
and corresponding recurrent expenditures (for the government) or losses (for the utility). It is clear that the 
24 Th   ere are varying deﬁ  nitions of what a subsistence level of water consumption should be. A commonly accepted level is 
40 liters per day per capita. For a 5-person household, this corresponds to 6 cubic meters per month.
25  Again, this involves some degree of arbitrariness. However, measures of willingness to pay can be recovered directly 
from potential beneﬁ  ciaries (see below). 
Table 4.
Public Interventions Should Target Diff  erent Groups in Diff  erent Ways
Households
Group Need for Government intervention




Y Y 1 Group does not need subsidies
Y N 2 Water needs to be provided at low tariff  s 
N Y 3 Need for connection subsidies, or payment facilitation
NN 4
Subsidized provision needed, through e.g. Lower connection fees and volumetric rates for 
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consequences of each type of subsidy for the government budget (or for the ﬁ  nancial health of the utility 
company) are not the same. Lastly, politically speaking, connection subsidies may be more visible than con-
sumption subsidies, but may yield lower long-term payoﬀ  , since households will quickly tend to forget that 
their connections were subsidized and focus on their paying the full tariﬀ  .
3-5 Who Should Pay for Subsidies?
Th   e question “Who should pay for subsidies?” is ambiguous, but intentionally so. Indeed, it may be inter-
preted in two ways. Th  e  ﬁ  rst one refers to an equity issue, and corresponds to the question “Who should 
bear the burden of water subsidies?”. Th   ere is no normative answer to this question. In practice, depending 
on the political context, the answer could be the general public; the beneﬁ  ciaries; particular groups of the 
society; etc. Th   e second one refers to a ﬁ  nancing issue, and the underlying question is “How can the subsi-
dies be ﬁ  nanced?”. Depending on, e.g., the development of the local ﬁ  nance markets, and the ﬁ  nancial status 
of utility companies, the answer could be through private loans; through general taxes; through speciﬁ  c taxes 
or user fees; through cross-subsidies; etc.
In the context of developed countries, the frontiers between the two questions are (or should be) 
distinct. However, in many developing countries, those frontiers get blurred, because of:
  (i)  the sometimes precarious ﬁ  nancial state of utility companies, and
  (ii)  the weak development of ﬁ  nancial markets.
Both factors combine to give ﬁ  nancing issues the front stage, whereas the equity (incidence) issue is relegated 
to a secondary status. For the rest of the discussion, it is convenient to distinguish connection subsidies and 
consumption subsidies. 
Due to the precarious ﬁ  nancial state of utility companies, consumption subsidies, which directly 
impact on the revenues of the utility, are a direct threat to its sustainability. If the latter is to be assured, 
subsidies must be compensated in some way. Th   ere are two usual and non-exclusive ways to achieve this: 
transfers from the government, and cross-subsidies. Cross-subsidies describe a mechanism by which a group 
of consumers pays a price for the service higher than the cost to the utility, thereby subsidizing other groups 
of consumers (e.g. the poorest ones) or activities of the utility (e.g. expansion of the network).26 Cross-sub-
sidies, at least in theory, have the attractive political feature that the compensation occurs within the utility 
and does not necessitate budget transfers from the government. However, in practice, achieving this goal 
supposes a careful balancing of subsidized and unsubsidized groups, so that the latter can eﬀ  ectively pay for 
the former. As explained below in section 5, this equilibrium is sometimes hard to maintain.
Due to the combination of the two factors mentioned above, utilities rarely manage to free up re-
sources or mobilize ﬁ  nance for new investments. Financing network extension, which is often a prerequisite 
for a program of connection subsidies, then becomes the crux of the matter, and the most pressing problem 
is to ﬁ  nd practical means of enabling utilities to mobilize cash to ﬁ  nance their investments costs. Cross-
subsidies have been one way to achieve this (see Laﬀ  ont and N’Gbo, 2000). In many countries, it has been 
customary to make developers ﬁ  nance the costs of bringing water to new developments. A proportion of 
those costs, which varies across countries, is then repaid to the developer by the utility afterwards.27 Other ad 
26  Cross-subsidies can also arise as the optimal way to fund universal service obligations (USOs), by which service 
companies have to operate under certain obligations such as universal coverage or non-discrimination over prices. See 
Choné, Flochel and Perrot (2002) for a rigorous exposition.
27  An example of such a system is the aportes ﬁ  nancieros reembolsables (AFR) in Chile.18  DESA Working Paper No. 63
hoc solutions include dedicated Funds ﬁ  nanced by surcharges on bills (Côte d’Ivoire, Argentina). However, 
in many countries, utilities or municipalities still have to rely on grants by the Government or by donors to 
ﬁ  nance network extension.
3-6 Implementing Common Forms of Water Subsidies28
Given well-deﬁ  ned objectives for a subsidy program (and in particular, supposing that intended beneﬁ  ciaries 
are clearly deﬁ  ned), designing the program essentially entails two generic questions: 
  (i)  how to channel subsidies to beneﬁ  ciaries?
  (ii)  how to target beneﬁ  ciaries?
Th   ese two issues are examined in turn.
Channels for water subsidies
As should be clear from the variety of tariﬀ  s which have been presented in section 2-4, there is also consid-
erable variety in the types of subsidies to consumers. Moreover, tariﬀ  s are only one way to subsidize water 
services. It is conceptually useful to distinguish two channels for subsidies:
indirect subsidies through prices of water services; • 
direct subsidies to end consumers. • 
Examples of indirect subsidies comprise block tariﬀ  s and volume-diﬀ  erentiated tariﬀ  s, which have 
built-in subsidies. Th   ese subsidies are called “indirect”, because they are not paid directly to the end consum-
er. Rather, the utility company is generally compensated by the government for losses arising from below-
cost tariﬀ  s. In an increasing block tariﬀ   (IBT), consumers consuming less than a threshold quantity of water 
(often the ﬁ  rst block limit, but in certain cases the second and subsequent blocks may also be subsidized) pay 
a discount unit price on this volume. Th  e  justiﬁ  cation for adopting such tariﬀ   structures is that “basic” con-
sumption should be provided at a discounted rate, whereas consumption above basic needs should be priced 
at full cost, or even cross-subsidize users that stay in the ﬁ  rst blocks. Th   e performance of IBTs as a subsidy 
mechanism will be discussed in section 4.
Example of the second channel comprise connection subsidies, and direct consumption subsidies. 
Direct consumption subsidies are paid directly to households meeting certain eligibility criteria to cover 
part of their water bill. Th   e main advantages of direct subsidies are that they are transparent, explicit, and 
minimize distortions in the behavior of water utilities and their customers. Th   e main drawbacks of direct 
subsidies are the diﬃ   culty of deﬁ  ning suitable eligibility criteria as well as the administrative cost entailed 
in identifying eligible households. Th   e direct subsidy system was pioneered by the Chilean government in 
1990, when it was successfully used to soften the distributional impacts of a convergence towards cost-reﬂ  ec-
tive water tariﬀ  s.
Targeting methods
Whereas subsidies through tariﬀ  s can be applied to all customers irrespective of their condition, it is often 
the case that some degree of targeting is involved: subsidies do not apply across the board, but are limited to 
consumers meeting certain criteria. It is customary to distinguish explicit targeting from implicit targeting.
Explicit targeting is based on a priori classiﬁ  cation of consumers into groups eligible for diﬀ  erent 
subsidies, based on observed variables. Ideally, such classiﬁ  cation should be based on individual household 
28 Th   e reader interested in a more systematic overview of the main forms of water subsidies is referred to the wide body of 
literature on the topic (in particular, see the references in Komives and others, 2005).A Framework for Analyzing Tariffs ... in Developing Countries         19
status in terms of income (and perhaps other socio-economic characteristics), in order to target subsidies to 
those households who really need them. However, this supposes that income is easily observable, and that 
an administrative system to monitor it is put in place. In many countries, these two conditions are not met. 
On the one hand, due to the importance of the informal economy, household income is hard to estimate. 
On the other hand, putting in place an administrative system for the purpose of administering water subsi-
dies often proves very costly. Th   ese obstacles have prevented most countries from going into that direction. 
In countries whose informal economy is not too important, one way to circumvent the diﬃ   culty associated 
with the costs of the income monitoring system is to utilize multi-purpose systems, which serve to deﬁ  ne the 
eligibility criteria for multiple social beneﬁ  ts. Th  e  Ficha CAS system in Chile is one example of such a system 
(for a description, see Box 6.2 in Komives and others, 2005, p 109). 
In the absence of a system to monitor income directly, selection of eligible households has to rely 
on proxy variables for income. Th   e most commonly used systems are geographic targeting and community-
based selection. Geographic targeting consists in deﬁ  ning the eligibility for subsidies based on the residence 
in certain zones or neighborhoods (e.g. districts) which are identiﬁ  ed as “poor”, while residents of “non-
poor” districts are not eligible. Community-based selection consists in letting community members decide 
which of their members “merit” the subsidy the most. Th   is system has been used in Cambodia. Th  e  perfor-
mance of these selection devices as proxies for income will be discussed in section 4.
Implicit targeting refers to mechanisms where households self-select into the diﬀ  erent categories of 
service (subsidized or unsubsidized), rather than being selected ex ante by the government. Th   is approach is 
increasingly used to deliver subsidies or beneﬁ  ts in a variety of sectors (see Coady, Grosh, and Hoddinott, 
2004). An example of implicit targeting is the case of the multiple two-part tariﬀ   discussed in section 2-4, 
which can be designed so as to allow low-consumption users to be separated from high-consumption users. 
Another example is when the utility company oﬀ  ers, in parallel with private connections, yard or community 
taps in which consumption is priced below cost. In that case, achieving a good targeting of the poor suppos-
es that a majority of rich households having the choice between the two services will opt for the individual 
connection, while the poor will use public taps. 
Implicit and explicit targeting are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, they are often combined. 
A typical example would be diﬀ  erentiated services such as individual connections and community taps, 
where community taps are oﬀ  ered as a possibility only within certain targeted neighborhoods. 
3-7 Other Criteria for Evaluating Subsidies
Apart from core economic criteria such as eﬃ   ciency, equity, and coverage, other public ﬁ  nance criteria are 
commonly used to analyze subsidy programs. Th   e criteria vary and may bear diﬀ  erent names from one au-
thor to another (for a discussion, see Le Blanc, 2004). It is convenient to group the most utilized criteria into 
two groups. Th  e  ﬁ  rst group gathers criteria which relate to the political economy dimension, and include 
administrative simplicity, incentives, and transparency. Th   e second group comprises criteria related to the 
long-term management of subsidy programs, such as visibility, sustainability, and ﬂ  exibility. Th  ose  criteria 
and their importance in the context of water subsidies are brieﬂ  y discussed below.
Administrative Simplicity 
Administrative simplicity can be seen from the governments or consumer’s sides. From the administration’s 
point of view, other things being equal, subsidy programs should be designed so as to minimize total costs, 
which include the government’s administration, monitoring and enforcement costs but also indirect costs, 20  DESA Working Paper No. 63
such as those cost associated with legal disputes arising from the implementation of the program, e.g. from 
private utilities wanting to renegotiate their contracts with the government or municipality. From the ben-
eﬁ  ciaries’ perspective, administrative costs include the time required for applicants to locate the appropriate 
oﬃ   ce where to apply, to understand and to ﬁ  ll out the requested forms, and to participate in the program. 
From a practical point of view, it has to be noted that very often only direct costs are known. Since they are 
of no signiﬁ  cant interest to governments, indirect costs are rarely known without ad hoc studies, even in the 
case of budgeted programs.
Transparency 
Transparency refers to the clarity of the program’s eligibility and participation criteria and eﬀ  ective imple-
mentation by the responsible entities. Since this criterion is more qualitative than others, it might best be 
deﬁ  ned it through a number of questions: How clear are the rules for allocation of public funds to the vari-
ous states, to local governments? At the local government level, how are beneﬁ  ciaries identiﬁ  ed and selected 
under the programs? Are there well-deﬁ  ned eligibility criteria for the subsidies? Are responsibilities in subsidy 
allocation clearly deﬁ  ned? Is subsidy distribution managed by an independent entity? Are any slots for pro-
gram participation reserved for the administration or local authorities? 
Th   e degree of transparency of subsidies provided through utilities is highly variable. Chile, for 
example, has a highly transparent system of direct water subsidies. Cross-subsidies, which are prevalent in 
the water context, are often far less visible than that, except for the utility. Th   e geographic variability of water 
tariﬀ  s is also an impediment to the readability of subsidies through water tariﬀ  s. Th   at is, most subsidies are 
implicit to a certain degree, and only the utility companies and the government/ regulator are able to esti-
mate precisely how they work and to whom they apply.
Incentives/political responsibility/popularity: 
Th   is criterion is perhaps the most qualitative of all. However, from a policy point of view, it is perhaps one 
of the most important in the water context. Th   e questions underlying this criterion might be the following: 
Are the incentives of the diﬀ  erent stakeholders compatible with public policy goals? e.g., given the ﬁ  nancial 
arrangements between the government and the utility, do utilities have an economic incentive to extend the 
network, service poor areas, increase metering, decrease unaccounted-for water (UFW)? Are individuals or 
institutions responsible for choosing participants in the subsidy program accountable, and to whom? Are 
institutions in charge of the program’s implementation given adequate ﬁ  nancial and technical means? E.g., 
are subsidies passed on to consumers through lower tariﬀ  s compensated by the government in a way that is 
ﬁ  nancially sustainable for the utility? Do entities in charge of the program have incentives to keep the pro-
gram under control (total cost for public budgets, cost recovery, etc.)? Does the program receive substantial 
support from the public and from politicians? 
Th   e importance of these questions to water subsidies compared to e.g., housing subsidies or direct 
budget support, is accentuated by the fact that intermediaries such as utilities stand between the government 
and the end consumer. Th   erefore, a complex range of incentives exists, which have to be taken into account 
when designing subsidy programs. In particular, when the provision of water is done by the private sec-
tor, regulation is of key importance to mitigate potential adverse incentives to provide low-quality services. 
Another relevant factor is that physical capital in the water industry is very long-lived.29 Th   erefore, a lack of 
29 Th   e infrastructure associated with surface water storage and conveyance and the pipe network can have an economic 
life of 40-60 or more years, longer than that of capital employed in the manufacturing industry or in other public 
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appropriate maintenance translates only very gradually to decreased quality of services. On the other hand, 
one-shot investment expenditures, e.g. to extend the network, are politically very visible. As a result, this 
feature generates incentives for short-sighted, resource-constrained governments to under-provide and delay 
necessary ﬁ  nancing of operation and maintenance expenditures of water utilities. 
Visibility:
Th   is criterion refers to the degree of visibility of all costs of the subsidy for taxpayers and citizens. In order to 
measure visibility, one must ﬁ  rst determine the actual subsidy cost and then determine how explicitly deﬁ  ned 
these costs are in the government’s budget. From a policy point of view, improving the visibility of a program 
has signiﬁ  cant beneﬁ  ts, such as better understanding of the full economic cost of providing assistance, better 
targeting in practice, and potentially less corruption. As a rule, costs are better known for subsidies on the 
State budget.30 In the case of water, which necessitates high levels of capital investment, the visibility of the 
costs of public investment programs can be expected to be low, since these programs will consist in one-shot 
infusions of capital (often ﬁ  nanced by donors), which are to be reimbursed in the long term as part of the 
country’s or municipality’s debt. 
Flexibility: 
Th   is notion corresponds to the ease with which a particular program can be modiﬁ  ed (parameters and / or 
implementation) or even terminated. In the context of water subsidies, this is best understood in the political 
sense: can the program be modiﬁ  ed or terminated without major political unrest?
Sustainability: 
It can be argued that “sustainability” is meaningless for an isolated policy because the government’s budget 
constraint implies a tradeoﬀ   between policy choices.31 However, this criterion can be applied in the follow-
ing sense: given the present economic situation and reasonable forecasts, will the policy still be feasible in 
ten years, or will it require major changes in design, or even be dropped? In the water context, sustainability 
problems are notably driven by the highly capital-intensive nature of the industry. Th   e main issue is the com-
patibility of investment programs with the subsequent expenditures that must be incurred (typically by local 
governments) on operation and maintenance to sustain the investments. Th   is has been a pervasive problem 
in many developing countries. 
Sustainability can also refer to technical capacities at the country or local level to manage the utilities 
or, in the case of public-private partnerships, the relations with the private providers, once initial investments 
or projects have been delivered. 
3-8 Subsidy Measurement Issues
As the discussion above illustrates, some of the criteria used for the analysis of subsidy programs are not eas-
ily identiﬁ  ed through quantitative indicators, except at times on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, some criteria 
have multiple dimensions, and various indicators may be required to identify a particular criterion. More-
over, even when quantitative indicators come to mind, their practical computation may be complicated, and 
30  However, this is often only true for direct costs, e.g., the amount of subsidy budgeted or distributed to beneﬁ  ciaries 
during a given year. Indirect costs are rarely known without ad hoc studies, even for on-budget programs. 
31  Alternatively, sustainability could be deﬁ  ned as whether the government can scale up the subsidy program to eﬀ  ectively 
address all the intended beneﬁ  ciaries. Th  is  deﬁ  nition would be in the middle of our concept of sustainability and coverage.22  DESA Working Paper No. 63
as such, not easily available. Th   us, in most cases, qualitative or semi-quantitative information summarizing 
program performance under speciﬁ  c criteria must be identiﬁ  ed.
Th   is section is concerned with two of the most common problems analysts face when examining 
water subsidy programs, namely:
measuring the total amount of subsidies received by households;  • 
measuring the distributional impact of those subsidies. • 
Once again, in this section our framework of reference is the utility model. In some cases, subsidies 
are on-budget, direct transfers to the end consumer, and the utility receives no subsidy. It is then relatively 
straightforward to answer the two questions above, because it can be assumed that the tariﬀ  s paid by the 
households reﬂ  ect the full costs to the utilities.32 33 Usually, though, money transfers go from the government 
to utility companies, not to households. Th   e basic problem here is to identify the benchmark price (tariﬀ  ) 
that should be used to compute the value of the subsidy received by the households. Due to the presence 
of the utility between the government and end consumers, not all of what comes out of government bud-
get may reach the household’s pocket. Ineﬃ   ciencies at the production and distribution levels can result in 
a “waste” of money. Th   e issue, then, is to measure these ineﬃ   ciencies. Also, transfers from the government 
may be combined with cross-subsidies. In such cases, how is it possible to calculate the share of the amount 
transferred that is passed on to households? 
Demand-side (consumer) approach 
In this approach, which relies on household survey data, including consumption of water and price paid for 
it, one typically computes the subsidy amount as the diﬀ  erence between what the consumer actually paid 
and the price that “should have been paid”, given observed consumption and a “normal” price” (see ﬁ  gure 3). 
Aggregation across consumers by quantiles of the income distribution then yields a measure of distribution 
of the subsidy across income groups. Th   is is the approach taken by most of the studies reviewed in the World 
Bank study (Komives and others, 2005). 
Th   e main diﬃ   culty of this approach is to deﬁ  ne a “normal” price or tariﬀ   that should reﬂ  ect the 
full economic cost of water provision of the utility. Th   is variable is not available in most household survey 
datasets. Usually, the rate of the highest block in the IBT schedule is taken as a proxy for it; however, direct 
examination shows that those rates overestimate or underestimate costs, depending on the case. Apart from 
the diﬃ   culties of deﬁ  ning the “normal” price or tariﬀ  , this calculation amounts to a static, tax expenditure-
style amount – i.e. it neglects the changes in consumption that would occur, should the household face the 
“true” tariﬀ  . Depending on the precise nature and implementation of the subsidies, it can be expected that 
changes in consumption would not be negligible in most cases.
Another methodological problem encountered is that subsidies are often measured with reference to 
water bills, not amounts eﬀ  ectively paid to the utility. Given the sometimes huge diﬀ  erences between billing 
and collection, this can result in both an underestimation of eﬀ  ective subsidies and biases in the estimation 
of their distributional eﬀ  ects. 
32  Even in Europe or in the US, water tariﬀ  s often fail to reﬂ  ect environmental costs (OECD, 1999).
33  However, as seen above, there are conceptual problems with the deﬁ  nition of a “marginal cost” in the case of water services, 
because : (i) temporal variations typically not reﬂ  ected into prices ; (ii) high-cost and low-cost customers are typically 
paying the same price for water, at least locally ; (iii) a high proportion of costs are not attributable to speciﬁ  c customers.A Framework for Analyzing Tariffs ... in Developing Countries         23
Supply-side (utility) approach
In this approach, the point of view is that of the government and the unit of observation is the utility. Th  is 
can be called the “diﬀ  erence method”, because subsidies to consumers are calculated as the diﬀ  erence be-
tween transfers from the government to the utility, minus all the losses incurred by the utility due to ineﬃ   -
ciencies (see ﬁ  gure 4). Th   e government provides a transfer to the utility to help it cope with current expendi-
ture requirements (either to break even or to achieve proﬁ  t). Th   e proportion of this amount that goes to end 
consumers is negatively aﬀ  ected by any loss of eﬃ   ciency occurring from production, distribution, billing or 
collection of payments. Th   e problem is then to measure these losses. Th   e latter two can be measured directly; 
the former two can be estimated by benchmarking.34 
Th   is approach is interesting because its results allow policy makers to separate out eﬃ   ciency consid-
erations from consumer subsidy problems. With very ineﬃ   cient utilities, it may well be the case that most 
of the government transfers are wasted; it could even happen that consumers end up subsidizing the utility, 
compared to a more eﬃ   cient situation. Note that in this approach, cross-subsidies are netted out because 
they represent transfers internal to the utility. As a result, distributional impacts of the subsidy cannot be 
obtained.
In conclusion, getting an accurate idea of the real impact of subsidies built into water tariﬀ  s implies 
examining both the economic (i.e. technical and commercial) performance of the utilities delivering those 
34 Th   is approach corresponds directly to the one taken by many projects in the water and sanitation sector, which heavily 
focus on the physical and commercial performance of utilities. Benchmarking is of primary interest in such cases, in 
order to examine the structure of costs and revenues, as well as to locate ineﬃ   ciencies in production, distribution, 
metering, billing, and collection. 
Source: Author’s elaboration
Figure 3.
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subsidies, and the distribution of water consumption at the household level. Results obtained from micro, 
demand-side approaches are dependent on the “normal price” taken into account for the subsidy calculation. 
Supply-side approaches, and benchmarking in particular, can help assess what this “normal price” would be.
4 How Do Subsidies Fare in Practice?
Th   is section examines the various aspects of the performance of water subsidy programs implemented across 
the world. We concentrate on a group of criteria outlined in the previous section, especially eﬃ   ciency and 
equity. Th   ose criteria focus on the direct eﬀ  ects of subsidies. Th   us, unless otherwise stated, we do not look in 
detail at the eﬀ  ects of subsidies on important outcomes such as health and children’s education. Th  e  section 
follows the plan of sections 2 and 3. It successively examines the issues of access to piped water; water prices; 
subsidy beneﬁ  ciaries; ﬁ  nancing of subsidies; and coverage targeting of subsidies. A ﬁ  nal subsection tries to 
place the debate on the eﬀ  ectiveness of water subsidies within a broader context. 
4-1 How do the Poor Fare in Terms of Access?
A look at aggregate regional ﬁ  gures shows that access to an improved source of water is far from universal. 
Another striking feature is the contrasts between urban and rural areas (table 5). A more disaggregated look 
at country ﬁ  gures (ﬁ  gure 5) conﬁ  rms that Africa is lagging behind the other continents, both for urban and 
rural access.
Data on African capital cities (ﬁ  gure 6) shows the extent of variation in access rates, measured by 
access to piped water. In 2000, the proportion of households having access to piped water varied from 27% 
Figure 4.
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in Cotonou (Benin) to 85% 
in Dakar (Senegal). Moreover, 
connections to the network 
are often more frequent for 
households having higher 
incomes (see Komives, Whit-
tington, and Wu, 2001, and 
Komives and others, 2005). 
Figure 7 illustrates the diﬀ  er-
ence in access to private water 
connections between poor 
and non-poor for some cities 
in Asia, Latin America, and 
Africa. Although the magnitude of the gap between poor and non-poor varies, it is a common feature of all 
the places analyzed in the studies reviewed by the World Bank paper.
As a result, by construction, consumption subsidies delivered through the utility network (i.e. to 
connected users) miss a substantial part of the potential beneﬁ  ciaries. Th   is feature can have huge impacts on 
both the targeting of water subsidies and their redistribution eﬀ  ects in developing countries. 
4-2 Th   e Price of Water
Utilities
Utilities often charge an initial connection fee, after which the household has to pay periodic (typically, 
monthly) bills that may or may not depend on its water consumption. Available evidence on connection fees 
presented in Komives and others (2005) found that water connection charges varied widely across cities and 
countries, ranging from only US$2 to US$450 (table 6).35 
As for water use charges, they also ex-
hibit high variation. Results from a worldwide 
survey of utility companies by Global Water 
Intelligence, documented in Komives and 
others (2005), are represented below in ﬁ  gure 
8. Th  e  ﬁ  gure shows the distribution of average 
water tariﬀ  s charged by utilities by continent. 
Boxes represent the part of the distribution 
comprised between the 25th and 75th percen-
tiles, while the extremities of the bars show the 
observed minimum and maximum tariﬀ  s. From this ﬁ  gure, it is apparent that apart from OECD where wa-
ter tariﬀ  s are above US$1/m3 for half of the utilities included in the sample, tariﬀ  s in the other regions of the 
world tend to be signiﬁ  cantly lower than that level. Whereas tariﬀ  s in Latin America and Middle East and 
North Africa may sometimes reach the US $0.50/m3 level, virtually all utilities surveyed in East Asia, Eastern 
and Central Europe, and Subs-Saharan Africa are below this level. Th   is has implications for the sustainability 
of the utilities (see below).
35  In many countries, there may be “parallel” charges beyond oﬃ   cial connection fees. Side payments are frequently 
mentioned as necessary to obtain a connection in the ﬁ  rst place.
Table 6.
Connection Charges for Water Observed in a Sample of Utilities
East Asia South Asia Latin America
Number of utilities 22 18 21
Highest 450 129 387
Average 101 42 128
Median 83 35 125
Lowest 10 2 20
Source: Komives and others, 2005
Table 5.
Percentage of the Population With Access to Improved Water Supply and 




East Asia 92 70 69
South Asia 93 53 80
Sub-Saharan Africa 82 39 46
Middle East / North Africa 96 92 78
Eastern Europe / Central Asia 98 98 78
Latin America 96 95 69
OECD 100 100 94
Source: Komives and others, 2005.26  DESA Working Paper No. 63
Figure 5a.
Access to Improved Water Source, Urban Areas 
Source: United Nations (2006).
Figure 5b.
Access to Improved Water Source, Rural Areas 
Source: United Nations (2006).A Framework for Analyzing Tariffs ... in Developing Countries         27
Figure 6.
Access to Piped Water in Selected African Capital Cities
Source: Gulyani, Talukdar and Kariuki (2005)
Proportion of households with access to piped 
water in Urban Africa, 2000












Proportion of Poor and Non-Poor Households with Private Water Connections for Selected Countries and Cities
Source: Komives and others, 2005
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Alternative providers
As frequently mentioned in this paper, alternative providers of water services have until recently received far 
less attention than utilities. It is thus diﬃ   cult to assess with precision their numbers, market shares, etc. in 
various countries. However, a systematic review of the literature undertaken by the World Bank (Kariuki and 
Schwartz, 2005) provides precious information about the ranges of prices charged by private alternative pro-
viders. Th   is information is summarized in the following graph, taken from that study (ﬁ  gure 9). Th  e  study 
conﬁ  rms that prices of alternative sources of drinking water tend to be higher than the price of water provid-
ed by utilities. Water provided by carters and tanker trucks is more expensive than that provided by point-
source vendors, which in turn are more expensive than private or public networks. Th   e ranking of sources by 
price that can be deduced from ﬁ  gure 8 proves to be robust across continents (Kariuki and Schwartz, 2005).
4-3 Household Expenditures on Water
Evidence presented in Komives and others (2005; p43-44) on three continents (South Asia, Eastern Europe, 
and Latin America) shows that monthly water expenditures of households tend to increase with income. 
However, the proportion of total income that is spent on water decreases with income. For households in 
the bottom quintile of the income distribution, the study reports average expenditures ranging between 
two per cent of income in South Asia and around 3.5% of income in Latin America and Eastern Europe. 
For households in the top quintile of the income distribution, those ﬁ  gures drop to, respectively, less than 
one per cent, one and a half per cent and two per cent. Th   us, overall water expenses do not represent a high 
proportion of household incomes. In low-income countries, expenditures on food, for example, represent a 
far greater proportion of total expenditures.
Figure 8.
Distribution of Average Water Tariff  s Observed in a Global Survey of Water Utilities 
Source: GWI, 2004, quoted in Komives and others (2005).
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Given the huge diﬀ  erences in the price of water from public or private networks and alternative 
sources, one could think that households connected to the network incur lower expenditures on water than 
unconnected households. In fact, it turns out that being connected to the public network is not synonymous 
with having lower expenditures on water services, as ﬁ  gure 10 illustrates. Figure 10 shows that in three of 
the four countries examined, expenditures on water are roughly comparable for households having access to 
private connections and households relying on vendors. Only in Pakistan are the latter paying much more 
than the former. For the four countries, monetary expenditures tend to be lowest for households relying on 
other improved sources such as wells. 
Many eﬀ  ects are at work: 
Lower water prices translate into higher water consumption. Th   e magnitude of this eﬀ  ect de- • 
pends on the price elasticity of demand for water. 
Easier physical access also translates into a lower opportunity cost of water, which tends to  • 
increase consumption.
Households having access to alternative improved sources such as wells often do not incur cash  • 
expenditures for them (there may be a cost associated with the time spent in fetching the water, 
but it is not recorded in the household expenditures).
Lastly, there are selection biases in the sense that the choice to connect to the network is not  • 
exogenous. First, households paying less than others before a network connection is made 
accessible will have fewer incentives to connect; hence, the average expenditures of those not 
Figure 9.
Observed Price of Water by Type of Service Provider, Compiled from the Literature
Source: Kariuki and Schwartz, 2005.30  DESA Working Paper No. 63
connected may be lower than what the average expenditures of all households would be if no 
household were connected. Second, as argued in section 3-1, some very poor households may 
prefer to trade time for money and choose not to connect, because they could not aﬀ  ord the 
monetary outlay implied by a connection. 
Th   ose intuitions are broadly consistent with the picture that emerges from a study of three cit-
ies in Kenya undertaken by the World Bank (Gulyani, Talukdar and Kariuki, 2005). Figure 11 illustrates 
diﬀ  erences in outcomes between households, depending on their primary source of water. Very few poor 
households have a private connection. Daily water use is about the same for all types of households, except 
those with private connections that consume 40% more water than the others per capita. In spite of this, 
per capita expenditures are about the same for all types of households, regardless of their being connected or 
not. Lastly, the survey also reveals that all households connected or not, have to access water from diﬀ  erent 
sources, due inter alia to the poor reliability of piped water service. Nonetheless, there are signiﬁ  cant diﬀ  er-
ences in average times spent to fetch water for the diﬀ  erent categories of households. Th   e study found that 
some households chose to trade oﬀ   time savings in exchange for low monetary costs. Speciﬁ  cally, uncon-
nected households with long collection times were more likely to opt for the status quo, rather than pay for 
an improvement in their water service.
4-4 Th   e Performance of Utilities
In most of the regions of the world, prices charged by utilities are lower than costs. Th  e  aforementioned 
worldwide survey of utility companies by Global Water Intelligence used the information on tariﬀ  s to assess 
the degree of sustainability of utilities, based on normative criteria. Th   e study found that overall, only 39% 
of utilities were charging tariﬀ  s that allowed them to fully recover short-run and long-run costs (Komives 
and others, 2005). Even in the OECD, only half of the utilities achieved this target. By contrast, among the 
Figure 10.
Household Expenditures on Water by Type of Primary Source in Selected Countries
Source: Komives and others (2005), from LSMS studies.
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utilities surveyed in Africa, none 
covered even their operating and 
maintenance costs (ﬁ  gure 12). 
Th  ese  ﬁ  ndings, although they 
may not reﬂ  ect particular cases 
of well-run utilities not included 
in the survey sample,36 provide a 
useful benchmark and comple-
ment and conﬁ  rm those from 
earlier, more localized, studies. 
Th   us, due to the low tar-
iﬀ  s practiced, utilities worldwide 
are in structural need of subsidies 
to balance their budgets. Th  is  is 
not, however, the whole story. 
Additional subsidies are needed 
because of technical and com-
mercial losses that drive a wedge 
between the theoretical revenues 
that utilities could achieve, given 
the prevailing tariﬀ  s, and their 
real revenues.
Available studies suggest that the eﬃ   ciency of utilities varies massively between countries. In Africa, 
the technical and commercial performances of utilities are often very low. As an illustration, a report from 
IUCN (IUCN, 2002) on South Africa puts numbers on the various stages between production and revenue 
collection for a typical water utility in that country (ﬁ  gure 13). Technical and commercial losses represent 
60% of total water produced. Figures mentioned for other African countries are even higher than those. In 
Kenya, it has been estimated than less than 17% of water is paid for in Mombasa and less than 32% in Nai-
robi (Gulyani, Talukdar and Kariuki, 2005).
Th   e logical consequence of these losses is that the portion of the subsidies paid by governments to 
utilities (assuming they eﬀ  ectively maintain utilities solvent) which actually reaches households is very low. 
Put diﬀ  erently, most of the government transfers are wasted due to technical and commercial ineﬃ   ciencies.
Th   e way subsidies are ﬁ  nanced varies across countries. We refer the reader to Komives and others 
(2005) for detailed country examples. It is interesting to note though, that both cross-subsidies and subsidies 
ﬁ  nanced by external transfers to utilities with the help of ad hoc mechanisms have faced diﬃ   culties. 
Cross-subsidies face three types of problems. First, as mentioned in section 3, the division of con-
sumers into subsidized and subsidizing categories in a way that allows a balancing of the costs (no net deﬁ  cit 
36  Africa is very heterogeneous in this respect. For example, some utilities in South Africa have been running for decades 
without government subsidies. Nevertheless, compared to other countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa is a very 
speciﬁ  c case. 
Figure 11.
Comparison of Households depending on Primary Source of Water,
Urban Kenya, 2004
Source: Gulyani, Talukdar and Kariuki (2005).
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Tariffs are enough for O&M and partial capital costs
Tariffs are enough to cover most O&M costs
Tariffs are too low to cover basic O&M costs
Figure 12.
An Assessment of the Sustainability of Water Tariff  s Across Regions
Source: GWI, 2004, quoted in Komives and others (2005)
Figure 13.
Typical Components of a Domestic Water Supply Balance in South Africa
Source: IUCN (2002)A Framework for Analyzing Tariffs ... in Developing Countries         33
for the utility from cross-subsidies) is hard to achieve.37 Over time, such a system faces two threats. First, in 
some contexts the categories deﬁ  ning eligibility for the subsidy may be subject to manipulation by interest 
groups. Second, consumers with alternative supply possibilities (e.g. ﬁ  rms, which typically pay higher prices 
than consumers) and facing high tariﬀ  s may opt out of the system. Both occurrences can leave in the system 
a growing proportion of subsidized consumers. Problems of this nature with cross-subsidies in Colombia 
are described in Komives and others (2005; Box 6.1, p105). In that country, water utilities suﬀ  er structural 
losses as a result of the subsidy scheme (equal to 20 per cent of sector turnover in water), and it is necessary 
for the national government to step in and help cover those losses.
A general problem when subsidies take the form of budget balancing subsidies to utilities is that the 
possibility of obtaining external budgetary support creates a disincentive for utilities to improve their perfor-
mance. 
4-5 Households’ Need for Subsidies and Willingness to Pay for Improved Water Services
As discussed in section 3, the question of which categories of the population should be the target of water 
subsidies should be answered on the basis of empirical data, relating most of all to local income distribu-
tions and patterns of expenditures. It is beyond the scope of this paper to review the available local studies 
on this issue, and the reader is referred to references in Komives and others (2005). An alternative approach 
to evaluating the adequacy of tariﬀ  s and the need for subsidies is to assess the willingness of households to 
pay for improved services. Th   e reader is again referred to Komives and others (2005) for a review of the exist-
ing studies. Interestingly, available studies seem to suggest that consumers would often be willing to pay for 
signiﬁ  cantly higher tariﬀ  s than those charged by utilities, in exchange for improved reliability of service.
However, normative approaches based on the notion that expenditures for water should not repre-
sent more than a certain percentage of income continue to be widely used. Th   is type of approach is interest-
ing in order to compare diﬀ  erent countries, regions, and cities in terms of aﬀ  ordability of water services. 
Such an approach has been used in a study by Foster and Yepes (2005). Th   ey start by deﬁ  ning a “minimal” 
or subsistence water consumption, the provision of which to every household may represent what a benevo-
lent government might think of as a valid policy objective. By varying the cost of this subsistence quantity, 
the authors assess, on the basis of income distributions, how many households would end up spending more 
than ﬁ  ve per cent of their income paying for it. Th   e results, illustrated in the following ﬁ  gure taken from 
Komives and others (2005), illustrate the potential sensitivity of water tariﬀ   issues, by showing that high 
tariﬀ  s have the potential to bring basic water expenses to levels that may be judged “too high” socially and 
politically. 
It is interesting to compare these results with the actual price of water charged by utilities. If water 
were priced at levels that ensure ﬁ  nancial sustainability for the utility (e.g. US $1/m3), the price of a typical 
subsistence water quantity (e.g. ten cubic meters per month) would reach US $10. At this level, more than 
30 per cent of households in East Asia, and more than 50 per cent in Africa and India, would pay more than 
ﬁ  ve per cent of their incomes for it. However, as we have seen above, tariﬀ  s eﬀ  ectively charged by utilities 
are often far below cost-recovery levels. For example, taking the average of prices reported for Africa in the 
GWI study (US $0.10/m3), the price of the ten cubic meters would be only US $1. At this level, according 
to Foster and Yepes, less than ﬁ  ve per cent of African households would pay more than ﬁ  ve per cent of their 
incomes for it (ﬁ  gure 14). 
37  A simple example is when the parameters deﬁ  ning eligibility to the subsidy are deﬁ  ned nationally (or for broad 
groups of regions or cities) instead of locally. In that case, depending on local income distribution, the proportion of 
consumers eligible will vary, making local utilities “structurally” better or worse oﬀ  . 34  DESA Working Paper No. 63
Interestingly, this latter ﬁ  gure is much lower than the typical percentage of households connected to 
the network that are subsidized (see below). Notwithstanding detailed investigations at the country or city 
level which as argued above should constitute a necessary step to the design of any subsidy mechanism, this 
result suggests that there is room for improvement in the way tariﬀ  s and subsidies are practiced. If subsidies 
are to address only aﬀ  ordability concerns, they probably could be much better targeted than they currently 
are. Utilities could probably increase their unsubsidized tariﬀ  s (thus progressing towards cost recovery) with-
out jeopardizing the ﬁ  nancial health of most currently subsidized households. 
4-6 Th   e Performance of Water Subsidies
Th   is section examines various aspects of the performance of water subsidies. We do not attempt a systematic 
examination of all the criteria identiﬁ  ed in section 3.7. Rather, we highlight issues which are prevalent in 
most of the developing world. 
Th  e  ﬁ  rst important point is that consumption subsidies delivered through low tariﬀ  s (e.g. IBT), 
which are the most prevalent subsidies worldwide, are typically not well targeted to the poorest house-
holds. Th   is is because, as mentioned in section 3.3, several hurdles distort the distribution of such subsidies 
away from the poor: 
Th   e proportion of households having potential access to the network is often higher for non- • 
poor households than for poor households;
Th   e same is true for the proportion of households that choose to connect to the network, given  • 
access;
Non-poor households connected to the network often consume more than poor households.  • 
Th   us, they will receive a greater proportion of the subsidies, since those are based on unit tariﬀ  s.38
38  Lastly, it can also be the case that poor households are less metered than non-poor households and thus are unable 
to beneﬁ  t from consumption subsidies. In such a case, the outcome would depend on the relative values of the ﬁ  xed 
charge for unmetered water use and the tariﬀ   for metered use.
Figure 14.
Proportion of Households Who Would Pay More than Five per cent of their Incomes on a Subsistence Water 
Consumption Under Diff  erent Tariff  s.
Source: Foster and Yepes (2005).A Framework for Analyzing Tariffs ... in Developing Countries         35
An example from Cape Verde, drawn from Komives and others (2005), illustrates the cumulative 
eﬀ  ect of these hurdles on the distribution of subsidies. Th   e prevailing tariﬀ   structure in Cape Verde was an 
IBT. Poor households had signiﬁ  cantly less frequent access to the public network than the whole population. 
Among those with access, the choice to connect was half as frequent among poor households. Th  ese  “con-
nection factors” alone biased the distribution of subsidies towards non-poor households. Moreover, poor 
households connected to the network were found to consume only half as much water as the whole popula-
tion of connected households. Even though, through the IBT structure, the resulting subsidy rate was higher 
for the former, this did not compensate for the diﬀ  erence in consumption. As a result of these successive 
hurdles, the ratio of subsidies going to an average poor households to those going to the average household 
was only 1:4 (ﬁ  gure 15).
Th   ese conclusions are not unique to the case of Cape Verde. Indeed, one of the main lessons from 
the World Bank review study is that access factors (including metering) constitute the main constraint to 
reaching the poor with consumption subsidies through low tariﬀ  s. 
Another feature of the IBTs which are prevalent around the world is that they are inherently badly 
targeted, because the size of the ﬁ  rst block (the most subsidized one) is too large, often well beyond com-
monly accepted subsistence levels. As a result, a substantial proportion of households, and not only the most 
poor, fall into the ﬁ  rst consumption block and end up paying subsidized tariﬀ  s on their whole water con-
sumption.
Th   e second important lesson is that administrative targeting can signiﬁ  cantly improve the perfor-
mance of tariﬀ  -based subsidies. As discussed in section 3, there is a range of targeting methods, going from 
categorical targeting popular in the former Soviet Union, to selection based on family structure and location, 
Impact of differences in access, connection, and 









































Successive Hurdles Aff  ecting the Distribution of Consumption subsidies to End Consumers : Example of Cape Verde
Source: Komives and others (2005).36  DESA Working Paper No. 63
with the most sophisticated methods relying on means testing. Selection based on family size alone is usually 
found to perform poorly in targeting the poorest households. Th   e power of geographic targeting depends in 
large measure on the correlation between poverty and location of households. It is thus clear that the level of 
detail of geographic information available to the administration will play a crucial role in deﬁ  ning adequate 
priority areas for subsidy eligibility. Geographic targeting has given interesting results in Nepal (Komives and 
others, 2005), but seems to have limited potential in Colombia and Senegal. In the last country, the exami-
nation of individual water consumptions reveals that although the average consumption did not vary much 
across most of the neighborhoods, there were huge variations of individual consumptions within neighbor-
hoods (Lauria, Hopkins and Debomy, 2005). In such a case, targeting based solely on geography will fail to 
identify the poorest households.
Another feature that clearly emerges from the review of existing studies is that water consumption 
subsidies are not a good redistribution tool. First, as mentioned above, water expenditures typically represent 
a low proportion of the household’s budget. Second, access factors biased against the poor make subsidies 
through low water tariﬀ  s very unlikely to reach the poor. Th   ird, correctly identifying poor households is 
often diﬃ   cult to achieve in developing country context. 
A ﬁ  nal point is that connection subsidies are not very common, although the potential beneﬁ  ts 
of such subsidies may in many cases be far important than their costs. As discussed at length in section 
3-1, the value to a household of a connection to improved water service can be seen as a stream of beneﬁ  ts 
which are a complex function of direct net savings or expenses from buying sources from alternative provid-
ers or fetching it from elsewhere (potentially allowing a reallocation of consumption); of indirect beneﬁ  ts in 
terms of time freed up to get water into the household; and of other indirect beneﬁ  ts related for example, to 
improved health or education outcomes. 
Studies which try to quantify all those beneﬁ  ts are rare. Most of the existing studies only consider 
one aspect. At the macro level, a study by WHO (Hutton and Haller, 2004) presents beneﬁ  t-cost ratios for 
diﬀ  erent types of intervention in water and sanitation for diﬀ  erent regions of the world. Th   eir estimates are 
often high, ranging from ﬁ  ve to 11 in most cases. However, they do not include the value of savings due 
to lower water prices.39 Considering only the savings associated with connection to the water network in 
Niamey and others (forthcoming, quoted in Komives and others, 2005) ﬁ  nd that the poor would save about 
US$0.75–$1.00 per cubic meter by connecting to the water system. Th   e yearly savings for a household con-
suming ten cubic meters a month is equal to between one-quarter and more than one-half the fee charged 
to obtain a connection, depending on the deﬁ  nition of poverty adopted in the analysis. In this case, the net 
present value of these cost savings quickly exceeds the cost of connection.
From these results, it seems clear that the potential of subsidies to the extension of the water net-
work and to connection should be explored more than is currently the case.
4-7 Towards A Broader View of Government Interventions Aimed at Increasing Access to Improved Water 
Services
Th   e traditional paradigm of consumption subsidies passed on to consumers through utilities via low tariﬀ  s 
has repeatedly shown its limits. In many countries, most of the subsidies given to utilities have been ab-
39  Included in their analysis are the value of time savings due to access to water and sanitation; the value of 
averted deaths; the value of increased attendance at work and school; and the savings in treatment costs due 
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sorbed by ineﬃ   ciencies, rather than passed on to consumers. In Africa in particular, access has remained low 
and is systematically lower for poor households than for the rest of the population. Due to the need to rely 
on other types of providers, many consumers pay for their water a substantially higher price than they would 
if the service provided by the utilities was universal and reliable. Yet, there is generally no subsidy going to 
households not connected to the network. 
Overall, the evidence presented above in this section suggests that:
  (i)    In many contexts, households would be willing to pay higher prices for improved services, 
thus potentially alleviating the burden on the utilities (and government) budget;
(ii)    Policies should be focused on increasing access to improved drinking water, rather than 
subsidizing consumption of tapped water provided by public utilities. 
Public interventions should aim at balancing a range of other levers, such as providing connection 
subsidies; providing diﬀ  erentiated services; and incorporating alternative providers in the overall picture. Th  e 
latter point includes devising an enabling framework for water provision; considering appropriate regulation 
of alternative providers; and considering the provision of subsidies to low-income households not relying on 
the public network.
5 Conclusion: Incorporating the Framework Into Water Sector Reforms in Africa
Th   is paper has focused on presenting a framework to analyze water tariﬀ  s and subsidies as they exist today in 
developing countries. Th   e main conclusion from the review of empirical evidence is that designing tariﬀ  s and 
subsidies for water has proven to be a challenge almost everywhere. Conﬂ  icting economic objectives (cost 
recovery versus aﬀ  ordable tariﬀ  s), social constraints (low incomes coupled with the fact that water is seen as a 
necessity), and incentives problems linked to the nature of the industry combine to create a range of conﬂ  ict-
ing issues, the importance of which varies across countries. Th   e performance of water subsidies on diﬀ  erent 
criteria varies greatly according to country, design, ﬁ  nancing, etc. Nonetheless, a certain number of robust 
conclusions clearly emerge from the existing evidence. 
First, aﬀ  ordability of public water services constitutes only one facet of the problem. Its relevance 
increases as access to piped water gets closer to universality. On the contrary, in many countries and in Africa 
in particular, access to improved water services continues to be the main constraint. Provision of access has 
the potential to improve welfare considerably through, e.g., allowing the poor to shift to improved quality 
public water from alternative supply sources, improving health outcomes and freeing time for education and 
income-generating activities. 
Second, in most countries water tariﬀ  s are not a good redistribution tool. Th   is poor performance 
relative to other subsidy mechanisms is due to many factors, including its indirect nature; the small propor-
tion of poor households that are connected; and the relatively small share of water expenditures in household 
budgets. Th  us,  redistribution  per se should not be the aim of water consumption subsidies. 
Th  ird, notwithstanding the argument above, there is scope for public intervention in both ensur-
ing that poor households can eventually get access to improved water sources and that water tariﬀ  s are not 
too high for the poor. But individual household connections are only one of the ways by which this can be 
achieved. Other forms of provision need to be considered as possible alternatives.38  DESA Working Paper No. 63
Fourth, from the available evidence, willingness to pay for improved services may be higher than 
supposed (or conveniently assumed) by politicians or regulators in poor countries. It is thus probable that 
the low tariﬀ  s for water observed across the world do not adequately reﬂ  ect the capacity of households to pay 
for improved water provision, thus imposing unnecessary burdens on ﬁ  nancially overstretched utilities. At 
any rate, tariﬀ  s levels and associated subsidies should be determined on a case-by-case basis based on empiri-
cal data, rather than assumed willingness to pay. 
Th   is set of ﬁ  ndings may fall short of providing concrete recipes to policy makers. Water sector 
reforms do not begin with a tabula rasa but take place within the context of existing infrastructure and 
networks for water delivery, as well as preexisting tariﬀ  s and subsidies.40 Th   is section is devoted to the 
examination of the links between abstract principles and lessons, and the implementation of water reforms 
in developing countries. In short, how can the framework laid out above be successfully integrated into the 
design and implementation of water reforms? 
As should be apparent from the analysis presented in the previous sections, political economy 
constraints are a major factor to take into account when trying to reform tariﬀ  s and subsidies in the water 
sector. Th   is message is further reinforced by the examination of concrete project documents from multilat-
eral donors such as the World Bank. Th   is has a number of implications. First, reforms of tariﬀ  s and subsidies 
have to be gradual. Second, the idiosyncratic features of local markets, including income distribution, water 
tariﬀ  s, and the prevailing institutional arrangements for water delivery, determine in large part the limits 
within which transition paths from old conditions to new conditions have to be designed. Th  e  ambition 
of this section is not to cover any particular country circumstances in detail. Rather, focusing on Africa, 
we want to highlight issues that seem relevant for water reforms more or less across the board, although of 
course to varying degrees depending on the country examined. Having done that, we present some tentative 
recommendations.
5-1 Water Reforms in Africa: Some Political Economy Issues 
Maybe the most urgent and general problem in the context of water provision in Africa is how to cope with 
the rapid urbanization which has been occurring across the continent. Urban areas in Africa are bearing the 
brunt of demographic pressure, facing increased demand for urban services as rural to urban migrations 
continue to feed the rapid growth of cities. As emphasized in recent work (Fay and Opal, 2002), in most 
of Africa in the 1990s, urbanization was not accompanied by income growth, which has compounded the 
diﬃ   culties of providing adequate services to the major part of the population. As an example, in the case of 
Dakar, Senegal, it is estimated that 100,000 to 120,000 new migrants come to the city each year (Lauria, 
Hopkins, and Debomy, 2005). Relevant to water and infrastructure in general, most of this sustained urban-
ization has occurred in an extra-legal context, meaning that most African governments have not been able to 
oﬀ  er incoming migrants adequate facilities in terms of water, sanitation, roads, as well as other basic ameni-
ties. Almost by deﬁ  nition, migrants coming to the periphery of cities face the most diﬃ   cult conditions in 
terms of access to water. First, peri-urban neighborhoods are not likely to be connected to public networks, 
given the frequent backlogs and lags between the physical occupation of new areas and the eﬀ  ective provision 
of public water services. Second, most of the urbanization is illegal in one way or another,41 resulting in legal 
obstacles for utilities to provide services to residents. Th   is is an acute problem in various countries.
40  See e.g. Brook and Locussol, 2004, for a description of the reform of the subsidy system in Guinea.
41 Th   is may occur for a number of reasons, the importance of which varies across countries. Th   e land occupied by new 
settlements may have been invaded or illegally subdivided; or it may be classiﬁ  ed as non-residential in urban planning 
or zoning documents; or the construction may lack a building permit or certiﬁ  cate of conformity. Th   e result is the 
same: without a formal property title, households cannot access public services.A Framework for Analyzing Tariffs ... in Developing Countries         39
Another clear constraint which manifests itself across the board in Africa is the precarious ﬁ  nancial 
status of most utilities. Many utilities do not even recover operating and maintenance costs. In those cases, 
how to ﬁ  nance and speed up the ﬁ  nancing of network extensions? Although ad hoc solutions have been de-
vised, reliance on external grants remains the rule for most of the investments. Th   is lack of ﬁ  nancial sustain-
ability results in so-called “low-equilibrium traps”, whereby utilities cannot adequately maintain and extent 
the network; the quality of services deteriorates; households or industries have to secure consumption from 
other providers; the most well-oﬀ   consumers opt out of the system, which further undermines the viability 
of the utility. Related to this ﬁ  nancial sustainability equation are, on one hand, questions of capacity of con-
sumers to pay for services, and on the other, eﬃ   ciency and commercial performance of utilities. On the con-
sumer side, it is worth mentioning once again that a key indicator of the extent of aﬀ  ordability is the propor-
tion of households that do not connect to the network, even though the possibility exists. Further evidence 
on the reasons why households choose not to connect to the network is needed,42 along with traditional data 
on income and expenditures, to improve our understanding of the extent of aﬀ  ordability constraints. On 
the utility side, what seems clear from the evidence accumulated in Africa is that substantial improvements 
in the ﬁ  nancial health of utilities could in many cases be reached by working on improving the physical and 
commercial sides of water production and delivery. 
5-2 Recommendations
It is outside the scope of this paper to provide a comprehensive list of possible actions by governments will-
ing to reform water tariﬀ  s and subsidies. Such a task would indeed be formidable, given the broad range 
of actions that are at the disposal of governments in this domain. Th   ose include in particular core norma-
tive decisions such as allocation of water between sectors or types of consumers; water pricing; the design 
of water subsidies; and reﬁ  ning the role of the State as a utility regulator and incentive provider. But they 
also include broader enabling actions such as devising adequate frameworks for cooperation between levels 
of governments in the delivery of services; giving support to alternative providers; and getting communities 
involved in the decisions regarding the delivery of basic services. Rather, this ﬁ  nal section aims at providing a 
limited number of lessons and recommendations that emerge from the available empirical analyses and seem 
robust to a wide range of speciﬁ  c circumstances. 
1) More data are needed
Micro-level data on household incomes, water consumption, and expenditure patterns, as well as assessment 
studies, are a prerequisite to sound policy formulation in the water sector. In particular, they should be used 
to determine the level and structure of the water tariﬀ  s that can be supported locally; the necessity of subsi-
dies; and the type of subsidies needed and their probable incidence. In many contexts, such basic data and 
assessments are lacking. Data are also needed on a continuous time basis to monitor the subsidy program or 
to put in place administrative selection mechanisms.
Th   e initial assessment should pay as much attention to the aﬀ  ordability of the connections as to 
the aﬀ  ordability of the service itself. Connections often entail upfront costs, both in the form of company 
charges and in the need for complementary household investments. Th   ese costs can be prohibitive for poor 
42  Beyond aﬀ  ordability constraints, other reasons could include the existence of alternative ways of provision; 
technical or ﬁ  nancial constraints stemming from the necessity to install end equipment (faucet, etc.) to be 
able to beneﬁ  t from the service; political constraints, for example in neighborhoods controlled by landlords 
who also have a ﬁ  nancial interest in alternative forms of water delivery services; and regulatory constraints 
(e.g. informal housing is not eligible for provision by public utilities).40  DESA Working Paper No. 63
households with no or limited access to borrowing. As mentioned above, more data and studies are needed 
on the extent to which and on the reasons why households with potential access to the public water network 
choose not to connect. Lack of uptake by poor households is potentially a major factor in the regressivity of 
consumption subsidies.
2) Many of the current subsidy schemes would need to be better designed in order to improve targeting 
and increase coverage of poor populations 
Water tariﬀ  s and subsidies are only a facet of development challenges in water and sanitation. In order to 
devise more equitable schemes, governments need to consider the big picture, including all the factors that 
potentially inﬂ  uence the provision of basic services to the poor: Th   ose include in particular:
low or very low overall access rates;  • 
disparities in rates of access between urban, peri-urban and rural areas;  • 
legal and administrative constraints (e.g. urban planning and zoning documents in peri-urban  • 
areas; legal limitations on the provision of basic services to dwellings not complying fully with 
the law) ; 
unclear and/or anti-poor regulation of the sector (e.g. by giving legal monopolies to utilities over  • 
areas which they currently do not serve). 
3) In order to increase access to safe drinking water, governments need to consider a broader array of 
interventions than solely subsidizing utility companies, 
In many contexts, and notwithstanding varying local situations, policies should be focused on increasing ac-
cess to improved drinking water, rather than subsidizing utilities. Public interventions should aim at balanc-
ing a range of other levers, such as: 
considering how to speed up extensions of the network, especially in fast growing peri-urban  • 
areas ; 
providing connection subsidies to households who cannot aﬀ  ord connections to an already  • 
existing network;
providing diﬀ  erentiated services, associated with tariﬀ  s reﬂ  ecting the diﬀ  erence in service qual- • 
ity;
incorporating alternative providers in the overall picture, including devising an enabling frame- • 
work for water provision; considering appropriate regulation of alternative providers; and 
considering the case for providing subsidies to low-income households not relying on the public 
network.
4) Financing needs of utilities need to be separated from subsidy issues 
As brieﬂ  y explained in this paper, in many countries the “traditional” way to deal with utilities has consisted 
in mandating low tariﬀ  s, in exchange for compensating for the losses incurred through various means (see 
section 3-4 above). Such transfers to utilities mix two diﬀ  erent ﬁ  nancial issues, i.e. utility ﬁ  nancing needs 
and social equity considerations. Due to political economy problems of various kinds, in practice this has 
often meant unfunded subsidies, lack of incentives for utility eﬃ   ciency, or both, resulting in declining qual-
ity of service which further undermines the viability of the utility. For the regulator or the government, it is 
diﬃ   cult to sort out, in the ﬁ  nancing requests of the utilities, how much relates to eﬃ   ciency problems and 
how much relates to actual consumer subsidies.A Framework for Analyzing Tariffs ... in Developing Countries         41
As mentioned above, social concerns are legitimate, but the responsibility to assist poor customers 
should belong to the government, not to the utility. Utilities should be allowed to charge sustainable tariﬀ  s 
(although properly monitored), and subsidies to needy customers should be provided by the appropriate 
level of government. Th   e advantages of such an unbundling are manifold:
sustainable tariﬀ  s are the best guarantee to sustained services in the medium to long run; • 
such a separation makes consumer subsidies more transparent,  • 
the framework provides better incentives for utilities and governments. • 
Better incentives and increased transparency may constitute the main reasons why multilateral do-
nors have increasingly shifted their projects towards output-based ﬁ  nance and subsidies. In this framework, 
project ﬁ  nancing and subsidies are delivered based on the completion of performance targets in terms of, 
e.g., households connected to the network, rather than provided as general support to the utility. It may also 
be noted that the recommendation to separate subsidies from ﬁ  nance constitutes a basic paradigm in other 
sectors, such as housing.43 
43  For example, it is generally recommended, when the economic environment allows it, to substitute interest rate 
subsidies on mortgages, delivered through bank intermediaries, with direct (so-called “upfront”) subsidies which either 
increase the household down payment or come in the form of a deduction from payments of a mortgage taken at the 
market rate.42  DESA Working Paper No. 63
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